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I INTRODUCTION
In the past it has been a most common practice of great and powerful
combinations engaged in commerce-notably the Standard Oil Co., and
the American Tobacco Co., and others of less notoriety, but of great in-
fluence-to lower prices of their commodities, oftentimes below the
cost of production in certain communities and sections where they had
competition, with the intent to destroy and make unprofitable the busi-
ness of their competitors, and with the ultimate purpose in view of
thereby acquiring a monopoly in the particular locality or section in
which the discriminating price is made. Every concern that engages in
this evil practice must of necessity recoup its losses in the particular
communities or sections where their commodities are sold below cost
or without a fair profit by raising the price of this same class of com-
modities above their fair market value in other sections or communi-
ties.
1
In these words the House Judiciary Committee described the
evil which section 2 of the Clayton Act was designed to remedy.
That evil was the predatory behavior of large, multi-market
firms which, it was thought, were undercutting local rivals at
uneconomic pricing levels while recouping their losses or lost
profits through monopoly pricing in other markets. Although
the details of the scenario described by the Judiciary Commit-
tee might be erroneous, 2 few would quarrel with a view of pred-
1. -LR. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914).
2. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 124 (1972). See also
D. DEwEY, THE THEORY OF IMPERFECT COMPETIoN: A RADIcAL RECONSTRUC-
TION 128-30 (1969).
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atory pricing as anticompetitive. 3 Of course, not all price
differentials are anticompetitive, and it is not clear that all dis-
crimination that produces anticompetitive effects is predatorily
motivated.4 Apparently recognizing these points, Congress
chose to prohibit only discrimination that was likely to produce
anticompetitive effects. Congress also sensed, however, the dif-
ficulties in formulating refined criteria for distinguishing be-
tween innocuous and non-innocuous discrimination. It
therefore limited its prohibition to circumstances "where the
effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce,"5 and, thus, provided no guidelines for administrators of
the Act to use in identifying the anticompetitive kind of dis-
crimination. The development of such criteria became the re-
sponsibility of the newly established Federal Trade
Commission and the courts.6 When Congress amended section
2 by enacting the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936,7 it was con-
cerned primarily with the impact of supplier discrimination
among buyers (secondary-line injury) and among the buyers'
customers (tertiary-line injury) and it added language which
reflected that concern.8 Congress clid little, however, to clarify
3. "Predatory" is a term used to describe pricing at uneconomic levels
employed by a firm to drive rivals from the marketplace, force them to sell out
on favorable terms, or discipline them for failure to conform to the wishes of
the firm practicing such pricing. See Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting and
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 1045, 1048. See also
Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927-28 (10th Cir. 1975). Predatory intent
does not constitute a necessary element of a Robinson-Patman Act violation,
but its presence enables the Commission and the courts to dispense with an
economic analysis of the marketplace when ascertaining the probable impact of
price discrimination on competition. See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371
F.2d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 1967). See also Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,
386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967). Professors Areeda and Turner have recently argued
that intent should be irrelevant to the determination of the lawfulness of un-
dercutting pricing. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697, 699 (1975). See text
accompanying note 311 infra.
4. Thus, the Commission and the courts have construed the Robinson-
Patman Act as forbidding discriminatory pricing that is nonpredatory but none-
theless anticompetitive in its potential effects. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Conti-
nental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702-03 (1967).
5. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1976)).
6. See notes 323-324 infra.
7. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b (1976).
8. In section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress forbade price
discrimination "where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of ei-
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the standards to be employed in distinguishing discrimination
that might unlawfully reduce competition between the discrim-
inating seller and its rivals (primary-line discrimination). 9
Entrusted with the primary duty of enforcing price-discrim-
ination law, the Commission has been constrained to formulate
its own enforcement criteria. In theory, the Commission might
exhaustively investigate the facts of each case of alleged dis-
crimination and weigh the positive and negative results. How-
ever, this would be an impossible task for an agency of limited
resources. 10 And no matter how exhaustively the Commission
were to investigate particular cases, it necessarily would have
to establish its own standards for determining which results
should be considered procompetitive or neutral, which results
should be considered anticompetitive, and how to balance
mixed effects. The Commission's enforcement responsibilities,
however, exert pressure upon it to formulate decisional stan-
dards that reduce the scope of the economic investigations
which it must undertake in each case.
The Commission and the courts have had forty-three years
of experience in applying the Robinson-Patman Act's rather
opaque strictures against discrimination that carries the poten-
tial for primary-line competitive injury. An examination and an
evaluation of that experience will be undertaken in this Article.
During the first twenty-five years after the passage of the Act,
the Commission and the courts groped for, but ultimately dis-
missed as perverse, a per se or presumptive approach to the
question of injury to seller-level competition." Although the
Commission ultimately strove for a market-oriented test of
competitive injury, it was never successful in formulating a
workable standard. Its attempts at articulation of such a stan-
dard were not received hospitably by the courts of appeals.' 2
ther of them ...." Id. § 13(a). The explicit reference to an adverse effect on
competition with the recipient and with customers of the discriminator or the
recipient incorporates Congress' concern with the effects of discrimination
down the distribution chain. See Gifford, Assessing Secondary-Line Injury
Under the Robinson-Patman Act: The Concept of "Competitive Advantage," 44
GEO. WASH. L. R.v. 48, 50-52 (1975).
9. The Robinson-Patman Act employed language explicitly referring to an
adverse effect on competition with "any person who ... grants . . . such dis-
crimination." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). See note 8 supra. The impact of this lan-
guage has not been fully developed. See text accompanying note 154 and note
344 infra.
10. See Gifford, Communication of Legal Standard, Policy Developmen4
and Effective Conduct Regulation, 56 CoaRnai L. REv. 409, 442-47, 467 (1971).
11. See text accompanying notes 32-71 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 117-185 infra.
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On the other hand, the Commission's primary-line efforts re-
ceived significant support from the Supreme- Court,13 but be-
cause of that court's limited abilities to intervene and apparent
naivet6 in price discrimination matters, 14 the Commission ulti-
mately gave way to the views of the courts of appeals. This has
been a serendipitous result, in that the courts of appeals have
become increasingly sophisticated in applying the Robinson-
Patman Act in recent years.' 5 The courts' conceptions of com-
petitive injury have at last largely eliminated primary-line
cases from the agenda of the Commission.16 Claims of primary-
line injury remain a weapon in the arsenal of private litigants,
but are used as claims ancillary to a charge of actual or at-
tempted monopolization. 17
A. VOLUME DIscouNTs AND THE ENFORCEMENT IMPERATIVE: A
M) SUCCESS
One area in which the Commission has responded with sig-
nificant success to the pressure to develop decisional standards
is that involving sales at volume discounts. Volume discounts
are cumulative quantity discounts pursuant to which the unit
price of goods sold to a buyer varies inversely with his respec-
tive total purchases over a specified period of time, frequently a
period of one year.18 In its decisions, the Commission has iden-
tified certain inherent "anticompetitive" tendencies in these
discounts. When the volume required to qualify a buyer for the
maximum discount is found to be beyond the reach of many
buyers, the Commission has found secondary-line injury to
competition due to the "competitive advantage" conferred upon
13. See note 191 infra.
14. Over the years, the Supreme Court has generally employed a relatively
doctrinaire approach to the Act. See, e.g., FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505
(1973); Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); FTC v. Mor-
ton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). In the very recent past, however, the Court
seems to have attained a degree of sophistication in its interpretation of the
Act. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 99 S. Ct. 925 (1979); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
15. See text accompanying notes 190, 304, 322-325 infra.
16. See text following note 304 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 322-324 infra.
18. This definition of volume discounts follows Professor Adelman's ap-
proach in distinguishing discounts for volume measured over a period of time
from discounts keyed to quantities shipped at any one time. Adelman refers to
the former as volume discounts and to the latter as quantity discounts. M.




large-volume buyers over their smaller rivals.19 But even in
those cases in which the volume required to qualify for maxi-
mum or less-than-maximum discounts is attainable by many
buyers-although only by concentrating all of their purchases
in a single seller-the discount tends increasingly to tie a buyer
to a single seller with each additional purchase. 20 Until a
buyer's aggregate purchases are large enough to qualify for the
maximum discount from more than one seller,2 1 the per-unit
price paid by the buyer decreases as the number of units
purchased by him from a single seller increases. A buyer who
switches his purchases from his original supplier to a rival sup-
plier would incur higher per-unit prices, even though the rival
offered identical prices for initial purchases and an identical
volume discount schedule.
In a number of cases, this inherent tying effect of a volume
discount has been found by the Commission to constitute at
least a portion of the requisite anticompetitive tendency for a
19. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). See also Gifford, Assess-
ing Secondary-Line Injury, supra note 8, at 52-58 (1976).
20. This tying effect is discussed, inter alia, in Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710,
766 (1965), rev'd, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968); in Minneapolis-Honeywell Regula-
tor Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 397-98 (1948), rev'd, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dis-
missed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952); and in Simmons Co., 29 F.T.C. 727, 742 (1939). See
also American Optical Co., 28 F.T.C. 169, 181 (1939); Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co., 28 F.T.C. 186, 198 (1939). But see Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 713
(7th Cir. 1968).
In order to remain competitive in price with a seller offering a cumulative
volume discount, a rival must offer a sufficiently lower price to compensate the
buyer "for the loss of the discount on that portion of its requirements which it
has already purchased or which it may be compelled to purchase" from the
seller offering the discount. Simmons Co., 29 F.T.C. 729, 742 (1939). In FTC v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510, 513-15 (2d Cir. 1951), the respondent at-
tempted to obtain part of the business of a customer, who was at the time buy-
ing a relatively large quantity from a rival, by offering to sell to that customer a
relatively small quantity of the product for a price that was below its own list
-price for a small quantity, but that was not below the quantity-discount prices
of either the rival supplier or itself for the larger quantity that the customer
was buying from the rival. Certainly, this technique would mitigate the tying
effect of a volume discount and might also mitigate a similar impact of a quanti-
ty discount upon a small purchaser. The court, however, affirmed the Commis-
sion's holding that such pricing was unlawful, and that the "meeting
competition" defense of section 2(b) was unavailable. According to the court,
"'an equally low price of a competitor' means an equally low price for a given
quantity." 189 F.2d at 515. But see Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435 (5th
Cir. 1966), in which a small carpet manufacturer was permitted to "meet com-
petition" by offering quantity discounts at smaller quantity levels than its ri-
vals. Since the firm offered a smaller product line, the court reasoned it would
otherwise be unable to meet the prices offered by rivals to customers who, be-
cause of purchases from those rivals of products which Callaway did not pro-
duce, already qualified for quantity discounts from those rivals.
21. See Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 713 (7th Cir. 1968).
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violation of the Act.22 In addition, the Commission has found
that volume discounts tend to give undue advantage to sellers
offering a large line of products over rival sellers who offer a
more limited line.23 Many buyers would find it advantageous
under these circumstances to concentrate their purchases with
the former in order to compile a volume of purchases sufficient
to qualify for a discount otherwise unavailable to them.
Yet the Commission has not been inflexible in its approach
to volume discounts. It has resisted the temptation to utilize
the inherent tying tendency of volume discounts as a basis for
condemning them generically. Rather, the Commission has dis-
tinguished among the situations in which volume discounts
have been employed and has, in some cases, found a lack of
primary-line harm when the circumstances showed that the ty-
ing effect was not present or was offset by other market fac-
tors.24 In short, the Commission has successfully isolated the
relevant primary-line factors connected with volume discounts
and has employed these factors as guides for its economic in-
vestigations in the cases which it has brought.
B. THE ENFORCEMENT IMPERATIVE IN OTHER KINDS OF
PRIMARY-LINE CASES: OPAQUE ADMINISTRATION
The enforcement imperative has often been reflected in de-
cisions in which the Commission offers only a summary justifi-
cation. Thus, a number of quantity and volume discount
cases25-notably those that were uncontested 26-have resulted
in cease-and-desist orders, the justifications for which were
mere unexplained conclusions of primary-line harm. The Com-
mission has disposed of a large number of customer-classifica-
tion2 7 cases and unsystematic-discount 28 cases in the same
22. See note 20 supra.
23. See id.
24. In Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C., 1580, 1602-03 (1956), the Commis-
sion found that product differences tended to offset the tying or group purchas-
ing effects of a volume discount. It also found that rivals who had not adopted
volume discount systems had nonetheless "increased their business and im-
proved their competitive positions." In that case the hearing examiner was
willing to concede that "[tI here may be industries or even lines of commerce,
perhaps in fungible goods, for example, where ... a conclusive presumption
(of an anticompetitive tendency) may be safely indulged in to the public good,"
but objected to the universal application of such a conclusive presumption as
"mechanistic" and as a "danger." Id. at 1598.
25. See note 18 supra.
26. E.g., Magnesium Co. of America, 52 F.T.C. 623 (1956).
27. E.g., Caradine Hat Co., 39 F.T.C. 86 (1944) (application of quantity dis-
count to customer classification by membership in buying group); Binney &
Smith Co., 32 F.T.C. 315 (1940); American Crayon Co., 32 F.T.C. 306 (1940), modi-
19791
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manner. In cases involving ungraduated29 geographical price
differentials, the Commission also has tended to act without en-
gaging in market analysis. 30 Most of these cases have involved
multi-market sellers who have maintained a standard price in
most of their marketing areas but have lowered it in a single
area in which its rivals were mostly local, single-market firms.
In these cases the Commission-perhaps impressed, as it ex-
plicitly noted in one case,31 by the fact that the impact of the
price reduction affected only a portion of the multi-market dis-
criminator's sales but affected all of the sales of the local ri-
vals-tended to find anti-competitive tendencies largely
without other explanation.
II. SALES DIVERSION AND THE MOSS CASE: THE
ENFORCEMENT IMPERATIVE GONE AWRY
A. THE COMMISSION's APPROACH TO Moss
The most drastic response to the enforcement problem
caused by the Commission's limited resources and concomitant
need to simplify and shorten cease-and-desist order proceed-
mngs was a "business diversion" test of competitive injury that
was formulated by the Second Circuit in Samuel H. Moss, Inc.
v. FTC.32 According to the Second Circuit, competitive injury
consists in nothing more than sales diverted-or indeed re-
fled, 223 F.2d 264 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 350 U.S. 907 (1955); Curtice Bros. Co., 30
F.T.C. 971 (1940); Nitragin Co., 26 F.T.C. 320 (1938); Albert L. Whiting (Urbana
Laboratories), 26 F.T.C. 312 (1938); Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938);
Agricultural Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.T.C. 296 (1938).
28. Unity Stamp Co., 44 F.T.C. 199 (1947); Life Savers Corp., 34 F.T.C. 472
(1941) (diversion is only explanation of primary-line harm); Federal Yeast
Corp., 33 F.T.C. 1372 (1941); Republic Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C. 701 (1941); National
Grain Yeast Co., 33 F.T.C. 684 (1941); Vonnegut Hardware Co., 32 F.T.C. 512
(1941).
29. Price differences are ungraduated when they do not vary systemati-
cally with distance from a given location or locations as do, for example, basing-
point prices. The latter are computed by adding the costs of transporting goods
to the buyer to the price at a specified locality. As a result, basing-point prices
change gradually as the distance from the basing point to the buyer increases.
By contrast, price differentials such as Anheuser-Busch's "nonpremium" price
in St. Louis and its "premium" price elsewhere are ungraduated geographical
differences in price. See text following note 95 infra.
30. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 F.T.C. 943 (1958); Arkansas City Coop. Milk
Ass'n, 54 F.T.C. 246 (1957); American Brake Shoe Co., 52 F.T.C. 484 (1955); E.B.
Muller & Co., 33 F.T.C. 24 (1941), afd, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944). See also
Southern Oxygen Co., 54 F.T.C. 1237 (1958); Metz Bros. Baking Co., 30 F.T.C. 268
(1939).
31. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 F.T.C. 943, 945 (1958).
32. Samuel H. Moss, Inc., 36 F.T.C. 640 (1943), afd, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
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tained-by a seller as a result of a price reduction extended to
only a portion of its customers.
In the Moss case the Commission had condemned discrimi-
natory pricing carried out by a manufacturer of rubber stamps
because of an alleged adverse impact on competition at the
seller level. In its opinion, the Commission stated that the re-
spondent's discriminatorily low prices were the "inducement"33
for buyers to transfer their patronage from its rivals to itself.
The opinion as a whole, however, does not actually equate di-
version of sales from rivals to the discriminator with a ten-
dency to lessen competition. In addition to using the
"inducement" and "diversion" rationales,3 4 the Commission
noted another factor, which provided a basis for its conclusion
of illegality. After concluding that the respondent Moss' prices
had an anticompetitive impact, the Commission, in the same
sentence, stated that "in some instances respondent's prices
were such that competitors could not meet such prices without
suffering a loss on such business and in one instance a compet-
itor was forced out of business as the result of such acts and
practices. '3 5 There is at least a reasonable argument that the
conjunction of the two parts of that sentence means that the
Commission based its conclusion of anticompetitive tendencies
upon evidence that Moss' discriminatorily low prices were, in a
significant number of instances, below its rivals' costs. 3 6 If this
was indeed the Commission's meaning, then the Moss opinion
33. 36 F.T.C. at 645, 646, 647, 648. Cf. Life Savers Corp., 34 F.T.C. 472 (1941)
(the inducement of sales diversion is the only explanation offered for the Com-
mission's finding of primary-line injury).
34 The Commission summarized its findings concerning several instances
in which sales were taken from rivals:
Such acts and practices of the respondent have the capacity and
tendency to induce the purchase of respondent's rubber stamps by var-
ious users thereof and have tended to, and do, divert trade to the re-
spondent from its competitors. The lower prices at which respondent
offered for sale and sold its rubber stamps to users thereof to induce
the purchase of respondent's rubber stamps in preference to those of
its competitors had substantially injurious effect upon competition in
the sale and distribution of rubber stamps in commerce between and
among the various States of the United States, and in some instances
respondent's prices were such that competitors could not meet such
prices without suffering a loss on such business and in one instance a
competitor was forced out of business as the result of such acts and
practices of the respondent.
36 F.T.C. at 648-49. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
35. Id. at 649. See note 34 supra. This suggested reading of the Commis-
sion's decision of Moss finds support in Purex Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100, 114 (1954).
36. See the Commission's approach in Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 68 F.T.C.




was not an example of an application of a mechanistic "diver-
sion" test of competitive injury. Rather, the Commission's ap-
proach fits more closely a concept of wrongful, although
nonpredatory, discrimination which it may have extracted from
the now-classic description, contained in the 1914 House Judici-
ary Report,3 7 of predatory pricing behavior: a seller makes
some sales below cost and subsidizes those below-cost sales
from revenues generated from higher-priced sales to other cus-
tomers. This argument, of course, assumes that if some of
Moss' sales were made at prices below its rivals' costs, those
sales must have been below its own costs.38
B. THE SECOND CRcurT's APPROACH TO Moss
When the Moss decision was reviewed by the Second Cir-
cuit,39 that court took a radically different approach from the
one taken by the Commission. The court read the Commis-
sion's opinion as equating diversion with a lessening of compe-
tition, an equation which the court then approved. To read the
Commission's opinion in such a manner, the court had to ig-
nore the sentence in the Commission opinion quoted above;
the court quoted instead-purportedly as the Commission's ul-
timate findings-the immediately preceding sentence, which
speaks of diversion but does not equate diversion with competi-
tive injury. Such an equation was made only in the reviewing
court's opinion.40
The court's apparent concern in Moss was that the Com-
mission's burden of proof be sufficiently light so as not to hin-
der the Commission's enforcement abilities. The court
attempted to further this goal in two ways. First, it placed the
burden of proving the absence of anticompetitive tendencies on
the respondent rather than placing the burden of proving the
presence of such tendencies on the Commission.41 Second, the
37. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
38. See text accompanying notes 165-171 infra.
39. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 734 (1945).
40. The two relevant sentences in the Commission opinion are quoted in
note 34 supra. The court quoted the first sentence but ignored the second. The
relevant part of the court's opinion is the following passage:
Finally, [the Commission] found that these practices had a 'tendency
to induce the purchase of respondent's rubber stamps by various users
thereof, and have tended to and do divert trade to the respondent from
its competitors.' That these findings supported the order is tou obvious
to admit of discussion.
148 F.2d at 379.
41. 148 F.2d at 379. Accord, Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co., 187
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court found anticompetitive effect in preventing, or tending "to
prevent, competitors from taking business away from the
merchant which they might have got, had the merchant not
lowered his price below what he was charging elsewhere."42 In-
deed, the court based its allocation of the burden of proof on
the fact that the respondent merchant was more likely than the
Commission to be aware of whether his low price prevented
competitors from taking away his business.43
Under the Second Circuit's approach, a firm whose discrim-
inatory prices enabled it to merely retain44 its sales in a market
and a firm that enlarged its sales in that market would both be
forced to defend their pricing actions solely under section
2(b)'s meeting-competition defense.45 The court may have felt
that use of "retention" language4 added little to the Commis-
sion's "diversion" language, since a discriminatorily low price
that had no market impact in terms of either diversion or reten-
tion could be excused under section 2(a), and a price that was
necessary to retain business could be justified under section
2(b) so long as it did not undercut a competitor's prices. A
F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Enterprise Indus., Inc. v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d
457, 460 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
189 F.2d 510, 515 (2d Cir. 1951) (on rehearing). The Commission took the con-
trary view in Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1580, 1604 (1956). See also Purex
Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100, 114, 167 (1954); General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 889-90
(1954). But see note 61 infra.
42. 148 F.2d at 379. The Commission had made no finding that the respon-
dent's discriminatorily low prices prevented any of its rivals from taking away
business. Indeed, the Commission's findings were all contrary to that position.
It found that the respondent's low prices induced buyers away from rivals and
to the respondent. 36 F.T.C. at 644-649. The Commission later equated the re-
taining of existing business through discriminatorily low prices with an an-
ticompetitive tendency in Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351,
397 (1948), rev'd, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
43. 148 F.2d at 379.
44. The court's formulation, quoted in text accompanying note 42 supra, is
couched in retention language, even though it literally encompasses both reten-
tion of existing business and expansion of existing business by diversion of the
business of rivals to the discriminator.
45. Section 2(b), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13(b), provides as follows:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this sec-
tion, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities
furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by
showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation
of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the
Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimina-
tion: Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a
seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his
lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser
or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.
46. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
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firm, however, may sometimes find that it needs to undercut
competitors in order to retain its sales volume or its market
share. In such a situation, therefore, the Second Circuit's treat-
ment of retention cuts deeper than a simple "diversion" test.
Under the latter approach, retention of existing customers4 7-
and, arguably, retention of an existing market share in an ex-
panding market-would not violate section 2(a) and thus would
not require justification under section 2(b). Under the Second
Circuit's approach, however, such retention would require sec-
tion 2(b) justification, and should a firm need to undercut its
competitor to retain business, a section 2(b) defense would be
unavailable. Despite the Moss court's emphasis on the seller's
retention of business rather than on the diversion of business
to the seller, the difference in language should not be empha-
sized unduly. The court did affirm a Commission order that it
characterized as based on a Commission finding of diversion,
and the court's opinion itself refers to the offending firm's bid-
ding as "'low enough to get the business,' " a description of
an apparently successful attempt to attract rather than retain
business. In any event, the differing shades of meaning con-
noted by the diversion-retention language should not draw at-
tention from the most problematic aspect of Moss: its equation
of sales diversion (and sales retention) with competitive injury.
The Second Circuit's adoption and possible expansion of a
"diversion" test of competitive injury was not without delibera-
tion. It was fashioned from an asserted interrelationship be-
tween sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act and
grounded on the respondent seller's superior knowledge of the
facts. The court determined that Congress intended to place on
the respondent, because of his superior knowledge, the burden
of proving either that "the lower price did not prevent anyone
from taking away the business" or that "his lower price did not
undercut his competitors, but merely 'met' their 'equally low
price.'-49 Such a diversion test was premised on a simplistic
equating of anticompetitive tendencies with sales diversion.
47. In addressing the issue of competitive injury, the Commission and the
courts have, in later years, focused on market share changes more than on di-
version or retention of specific sales. See text accompanying notes 196-198 in-
fra.
48. 148 F.2d at 379.
49. Id. The burden of proof on the issue of competitive injury (defined by
the court to mean business diversion or retention) is thus cast upon the ac-
cused. The Commission, under the Moss approach, would be required only to
prove discrimination. See FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510, 515 (2d
Cir. 1951) (on rehearing).
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The equation was simplistic because diversion should be the
point of departure,5 0 not the point of conclusion, in any exami-
nation of the impact of the pricing policies of a firm upon com-
petition in the marketplace. Yet the Moss court, composed of
Judges Learned Hand, Augustus Hand, and Charles E. Clark,
would not have made this apparently simplistic equation un-
wittingly or naively. Nor was the court's adoption of a diver-
sion test prompted by a deference to the policy judgments of
the Commission.5 1 The fact that the opinion was couched in
the language of statutory construction52 suggests otherwise.
The court probably sensed that the Commission's enforcement
responsibilities could be made more manageable if the work-
load accompanying those responsibilities could be dimin-
ished.5 3
Although the court may have been influenced by the en-
forcement problem, it had already solved that problem by cast-
ing the burden of proving a lack of adverse competitive impact
upon the respondent. The reason for taking the additional step
of adopting the diversion test may be that the two approaches
are interrelated. The burden of proof was cast upon the re-
spondent because of its superior knowledge. But the respon-
dent has superior knowledge on this issue only if an adverse
impact on competition is equated with sales diversion.5 4 In-
deed, this may be one reason that the court formulated the di-
version test broadly enough to include sales retention: the
respondent might have greater knowledge of the connection be-
tween its prices and its retention of sales than of the connec-
tion between its prices and the diversion of rivals' sales to
itself. If, however, an adverse impact on competition must be
determined by market analysis, then the respondent's superior
competence on the issue would, in most cases, vanish,55 and
50. See text accompanying note 87 infra.
51. See also NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir.
1951) (Frank, J., concurring).
52. See 148 F.2d at 379.
53. Such considerations apparently explain the Supreme Court's adoption
of a simplified approach to the competitive injury issue in secondary-line cases.
See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 50 (1948); Gifford, &upra note 8, at 54.
54. Since the respondent is an active participant in the market, it will
know better than the Commission which sales it has gained as a result of price
concessions, especially if the price concessions have been negotiated. It will
have, however, no better knowledge of general market conditions, of how to as-
sess those conditions to determine the intensity of competitive behavior, or of
how intense that behavior is likely to become in the future. The latter determi-
nations require the type of information gathering and evaluation that are
within the capabilities of the Commission's staff, skills, and resources.
55. Cf. General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 890 (1954) ("As to the fact of
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this justification for relieving the Commission of the burden of
proof would disappear.
C. THE DENOUEMENT OF Moss
Like other per se and almost per se tests, the sales "diver-
sion" test embodied in the Moss opinion evidenced significant
weaknesses. Indeed, it proved untenable as a single measure
of legality. The major substantive objection to Moss is, of
course, that 'pricing low enough to get the business" is exactly
the kind of behavior that a competitive economic system re-
quires of its participants. The Moss diversion test of competi-
tive injury thus rests upon an implicit attribution of a perverse
meaning to the term "competition": competitive behavior is la-
belled inherently anticompetitive. Widespread implementation
of the Moss rule would impose a cartel-like rigidity upon all
pricing behavior.5 6 There is a technical objection to the Moss
rule as well. In the form articulated in Moss, the diversion test
conflicts with the conditionally phrased language of the Act.
The Act certainly contemplates lawful discriminatory sales,
since only discrimination that has a tendency to lessen compe-
tition or to create a monopoly is prohibited. But discriminatory
sales must be successful in attracting the business or they
would remain only offers. Since Moss made discrimination that
successfully obtains business presumptively unlawful, the deci-
sion collapsed the tendency-to-lessen-competition condition
into the price discrimination itself, thereby joining elements
that the Act is careful to keep separate.57 For both the substan-
tive and technical reasons, the diversion test as formulated in
Moss could not be expected to last long.
The Second Circuit's Moss formulation was prominent in
competitive injury, [the respondent] would ordinarily have no peculiar knowl-
edge or means of knowledge."). See also note 53 supra.
56. Competitive behavior consists of continuous attempts by each firm to
maximize its profits or minimize its losses by underpricing its rivals whenever
necessary to attract business. If the Robinson-Patman Act were to make it un-
lawful for firms to attempt to obtain business by selective undercutting, this
price rivalry among firms would be significantly reduced. Each firm would have
to drop its prices across-the-board in order to attract business through price
cutting. Such a maneuver, however, would be impractical in an oligopolistic
market in which each firm knows in advance that its across-the-board price re-
ductions will be met by rivals and thus will not increase its profits unless in-
dustry demand is itself elastic. In such oligopolistic markets, selectively
negotiated price reductions are frequently the only reductions that can be
made; such price reductions are condemned by the Moss approach. See, e.g.,
Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 99 S. Ct. 925, 933 (1979); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). See note 7 supra.
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the Commission's Minneapolis-Honeywell decision 58 later in
the same year. In that opinion, the Commission appeared to
equate diversion of trade from rivals with competitive injury
and-like the Second Circuit-included the retention of ex-
isting business with the term "diversion."5 9 This strict diver-
sion approach to primary-line injury was short-lived, however.
Three years later, the Commission's decision was reversed by
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in an opinion premised
on the inadequacy of a "diversion" test of competitive injury.60
In evaluating the primary-line impact of price discrimination by
a manufacturer of automatic temperature controls, the court
employed a limited market analysis. Basing its conclusion
upon several factors, including an increasing number of com-
petitors, a reduction in the discriminator's share of the market,
and the patronization of rival manufacturers by some of the
discriminator's previous customers, 6 ' the court found that com-
petition in the marketplace was substantially unaffected.
Soon thereafter, the Commission itself adopted a more crit-
58. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948), rev'd, 191
F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
59. Rowe sees "[t]he zenith of the diversion theory" in the FTC's 1948 Min-
neapolis-Honeywell ruling. F. RowE, PRiCE DIscRImuNATIoN UNDER THE ROBIN-
SoN-PATMAN AcT 152 (1962).
60. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.
1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). The Commission had found Minneap-
olis-Honeywell guilty of discriminatory pricing that was embodied in a stan-
dard quantity-discount system. In refusing to uphold a finding of injury to
Minneapolis-Honeywell's competitors, the court listed six factors that it consid-
ered relevant. In summary form, these were: (i) prices charged by the compet-
itors were generally lower than those of Minneapolis-Honeywell; (ii) a high
degree of price competition existed among burner control manufacturers; (iii)
the total business of Minneapolis-Honeywell's rivals had increased, and new
firms had enjoyed steady growth in sales volume; (iv) Minneapolis-Honeywell's
share of the market had declined; (v) Minneapolis-Honeywell had lost 53% of
the control business of 31 customers who previously had used only Minneapolis
Honeywell controls; (vi) 126 of Minneapolis-Honeywell's other customers had
also purchased competitive controls. The court appears to have dealt explicitly
with the diversion theory and modified it with a form of market analysis when
it stated,
M-H was entitled to meet the competition built up in its field, and even
if it did succeed in retaining or diverting some business which might
otherwise have gone to some of its competitors, where those competi-
tors were able to enter its field and build thriving businesses in spite of
M-H's commanding position and alleged wrongful practices, we think it
cannot be said that the effect of those practices was substantially to in-
jure competition.
191 F.2d at 790.
61. See note 60 supra. The Second Circuit, however, continues to follow
the Moss approach to the allocation of the burden of proof. See John B. Hull v.
Waterbury Petroleum Prods., Inc., 588 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 1502 (1979).
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ical attitude toward finding primary-line harm. In 1953, the
spark-plug cases62 evidenced this new attitude. In these cases
each of three major spark plug manufacturers sold plugs to au-
tomobile and truck manufacturers for use as original equip-
ment at substantially lower prices than they sold similar plugs
to the same manufacturers and to other users and distributors
for replacement use.63 Complaint counsel contended that the
low prices were used by the respondents to obtain the original-
equipment business and that the prestige acquired from that
business placed the respondents' plugs in wide demand in the
replacement market.64 In two of the spark-plug cases, the hear-
ing examiner had found that the prices at which the respon-
dents had sold plugs for use as original equipment were below
cost.65 The argument was, therefore, that the low-priced origi-
nal-equipment sales were subsidized by the replacement-mar-
ket sales,66 and that the replacement-market sales were
protected to a significant degree from the competition of rival
manufacturers through the original-equipment tie.
The Commission, however, failed to give adequate atten-
tion to the contentions based on an original-equipment tie, and
found no primary-line injury in any of the cases. In one case it
bolstered its conclusion by finding that rival sellers suffered no
"undue" loss of business that could be attributed to the dis-
criminatory pricing,67 and virtually ignored the fact that the
original-equipment market was dominated by the three major
spark plug manufacturers. Instead, it found that price was not
the sole factor used by equipment manufacturers in selecting
spark plugs. 68 The Commission also bolstered its conclusions
in two of the cases by finding that the record did "not disclose
any undue mortality rate on the part of smaller spark plug
62. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 50 F.T.C. 73 (1953); General Motors Corp., 50
F.T.C. 54 (1953); Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, (1953).
63. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 50 F.T.C. 73, 76-78 (1953); General Motors Corp.,
50 F.T.C. 54, 60-61 (1953); Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 34-35 (1953).
64. General Motors Corp., 50 F.T.C. 54, 62 (1953); see Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
50 F.T.C. 73, 78 (1953); Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 37 (1953). This
practice was, of course, the "original equipment tie" that the Supreme Court,
twenty years later, saw as a major impediment to the development of a compet-
itive spark plug industry. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
65. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 50 F.T.C. 73, 78 (1953); General Motors Corp., 50
F.T.C. 54, 61 (1953).
66. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 50 F.T.C. 73, 78 (1953); General Motors Corp., 50
F.T.C. 54, 61 (1953).
67. Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 38 (1953).
68. See General Motors Corp., 50 F.T.C. 54, 62 (1953); Champion Spark Plug
Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 38 (1953).
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manufacturers."69
In eight years' time the Commission thus moved from a po-
sition that equated sales diversion with anticompetitive behav-
ior to a position which ignored, for Robinson-Patman Act
purposes, structural factors in the market which gave undue
advantages to the three dominant firms of an industry. In 1945,
the Commission in effect viewed all discriminatory pricing as
anticompetitive, and in 1953, it ignored actual anticompetitive
consequences of discriminatory pricing. Substantively, the two
positions are dramatically inconsistent. They are positions,
however, which are more understandable when adopted by an
agency that possessed inadequate resources to conduct a thor-
ough economic analysis of behavior patterns and market condi-
tions in each of the voluminous cases which fell within its
enforcement mandate. The Minneapolis-Honeywell position re-
flected a desire to short-cut market analysis by adopting per se
or presumptive approaches to the evaluation of price discrimi-
nation; the spark-plug cases' approach reflected an inability to
properly assess the impact of significant market relationships.
The Commission's Minneapolis-Honeywell opinion and its
spark-plug decisions are consistent in another way: the ten-
dency of both sets of decisions is to prevent the market from
becoming more competitive.70 It would be unfair to the Com-
mission, however, to suggest that it was deliberately pursuing
anticompetitive policies. After all, the Act's stated goal is the
furtherance of competition. It is more reasonable to assume
that the Commission was conscientiously attempting to carry
out this statutory mandate, but erred, in both cases, through ig-
norance or lack of insight.
D. THE REJECTION OF Moss
The Commission's spark-plug decisions seemed to evi-
dence an increasing reluctance to find primary-line injury.
That reluctance first emerged ten months after the Minneapo-
lis-Honeywell decision in a Commission policy statement on
geographic pricing practices. 7 1 The policy statement effectively
concluded a prolonged campaign by the Commission against
69. Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30, 38 (1953); see General Motors
Corp., 50 F.T.C. 54, 62 (1953).
70. See also M. ADELMAN, supra note 18, at 177.
71. FTC, Statement of Federal Trade Commission Policy Toward Geo-
graphic Pricing Practices for Staff Information and Guidance (1948), reprinted




basing-point pricing,7 2 a campaign in which it had won three
victories in the Supreme Court.73 In its policy statement, the
Commission took the position that systematic geographic price
discrimination injures primary-line competition when all sell-
ers employ the same geographic pricing method. "[T] he test of
injury" from geographic discrimination, according to the Com-
mission, "is to be found in collusion or in tendencies towards
monopoly."74 The statement implicitly repudiated the Moss
equation of discrimination and competitive injury, at least in
the circumstances of systematic geographic price discrimina-
tion.
In the spark-plug cases, the reference to the absence of
"undue" business loss by rivals attributable to the respondents'
discriminatory pricing implies a relatively tight causation re-
quirement,75 which was used to separate the discrimination
from the asserted sales losses. This technique is often em-
ployed by the courts in primary-line cases, 76 and its use in the
spark-plug cases may have been masking a shift in substantive
policy by the Commission. The shift, however, seems apparent
from the reference to the absence of an undue mortality rate
among the discriminators' smaller competitors; such a concern
focuses directly on the general economic health of those rivals
in the aggregate rather than on business diverted from them.
72. Sellers engage in basing-point pricing when they offer certain prices for
goods delivered to the buyers' locations and compute those prices by adding
transportation charges to the price at one or more locations. Each location that
serves as the base for computation of delivered prices to buyers is a basing
point.
73. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
324 U.S. 746 (1945); Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
74. FTC, Statement of Federal Trade Commission Policy Toward Geo-
graphic Pricing Practices for Staff Information and Guidance (1948), reprinted
in A. SAWYER, supra note 71, at 266.
75. Causation emerges as a crucial Robinson-Patman issue in a variety of
contexts. See, e.g., Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967); Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co., 68 F.T.C. 217, 261-62 (1965), af'd, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1967), See
Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting, supra note 3, at 1064-67. See also text ac-
companying note 81 infra.
76. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968). In Dean,
the Commission attributed the demise of a number of local dairies to the dis-
criminatory price undercutting of the respondent. The court, by contrast, con-
cluded that the small companies that went out of business were forced to do so
by changes in technology, which had destroyed the relative efficiency of small
dairies. It would appear, however, that the impact of the changing technology
on the small dairies was exacerbated by Dean's local price-cutting. The demise
of the local dairies thus was the result of both changing technology and under-
cutting. Yet neither the Commission nor the court openly confronted the com-
plexity of the causal issue and explained why it chose a particular contributing
cause as the significant one.
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The thrust of that reference is a concern with market condi-
tions, which appears more realistic than diversion and other
types of per se approaches to competitive injury.77
The emphasis upon market conditions grew stronger in the
Commission's General Foods Corp.78 decision, and in an exam-
iner's decision in Purex Corp.,7 9 both of which were decided in
1954. Both cases explicitly rejected the position-which they
equated with that of the Second Circuit in Moss-that sales at
different prices create a presumption of primary-line competi-
tive injury. Accordingly, both cases required that something
more than a diversion of sales be shown as a basis for inferring
competitive injury. Indeed, both cases suggested that an exam-
ination of actual market conditions is required in primary-line
cases and that this examination should focus on the actual in-
tensity of rivalry among firms. In this connection, General
Foods reiterated with apparent approval a checklist of market
factors employed in the Seventh Circuit's Minneapolis-Honey-
well opinion as indicative of the state of competition in the
marketplace. 80 General Foods, moreover, emphasized its con-
cern with competition in the marketplace by explicitly rejecting
the Second Circuit's assertion in Moss that the burden of estab-
lishing the absence of competitive injury should be upon the
respondent.81 After articulating this market-analysis approach
to competitive injury, both General Foods and Purex nonethe-
less phrased their ultimate conclusions on primary-line injury
in terms of a failure of proof, and General Foods found inade-
quate evidence to justify the attribution of a causal connection
between the respondent's discriminations and its rivals' losses
of sales. These cases thus manifest more stringent conditions
77. In Minneapolis-Honeywell, the Commission's finding of primary-line
harm, which had been based upon a pure diversion analysis, was rejected by
the Seventh Circuit in an opinion which listed six market factors that indicated
that no injury to competition at the primary burner-control manufacturing level
had occurred. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 790
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). See note 60 supra. It is in-
teresting to observe that the "expert" Commission, which had altered its own
approach to follow the Second Circuit's Moss theory, abandoned that theory
shortly after the Seventh Circuit's utilization of a market analysis in Minneapo-
lis-Honeywell.
78. See General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 887-90 (1954).
79. See Purex Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100, 111-17, 166-68 (1954).
80. General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 888 (1954). See Minneapolis-Honey-
well Regulator Co., 191 F.2d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1951), cert dismissed, 344 U.S. 206
(1952). See note 60 supra. See, however, the Second Circuit opinion in John B.
Hull v. Waterbury Petroleum Prods., Inc., 588 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 99 S. Ct. 1502 (1979).
81. General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 889-90 (19541.
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for finding primary-line injury, but this trend may have been
partially obscured by references to inadequate evidence and a
lack of causal connection between the discrimination and sales
losses of rivals.
Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co.,82 decided in 1956, proba-
bly contains the most articulate statement of a general market-
conditions test of competitive injury. There the Commission
found discriminatory sales to be harmless in a market that the
Commission described as competitive and fluid:
this record affirmatively shows that in this industry in the years in
question there has been ease of entry, opportunity for survival, growth,
and profit, excellent consumer choice of alternative products, efficiency
in production and an active race for improvement of product, redesign-
ing and the introduction of new types with supplier preference by
purchasers fluidly responsive thereto, technological advances, and a
fluidity and flexibility of market and of competition therein. The evi-
dence is unanimous that competition ... is active, keen, healthy and
increasing .... 83
Yale & Towne is explainable on the narrower grounds that
sales of the products involved (industrial trucks) were found
usually to have been made on the basis of engineering specifi-
cations and the particular requirements of the buyers rather
than on the basis of price, and that the price differentials, in
that context, were insufficient to offset customer product pref-
erence.8 4 The case does, however, enunciate another checklist
of market factors, which, the Commission asserted, showed the
presence of a healthy degree of competition. And, coming at
the time it did, Yale & Towne seemed to reinforce a trend in
Commission decisions to require more than discriminatory
sales or discriminatory sales plus some diversion to support a
finding of primary-line injury.
IIL SALES DIVERSION AFTER THE REPUDIATION OF
MOSS
A. THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF SALES DIVERSION AS A
FACTOR IN MARKET ANALYsIs
Although the Commission has explicitly rejected sales di-
version as the sole test of competitive injury at the seller
level,85 diversion has remained a relevant factor and occasion-
ally appears in the cases-especially the consent-order cases-
as the sole articulated basis for a finding of competitive in-
82. 52 F.T.C. 1580 (1956).
83. Id. at 1602.
84. Id. at 1597-98, 1603-04.
85. See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra.
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jury.86 Diversion, as observed,87 is a market effect that, barring
responsive price cuts by rivals, would be expected to result
from a seller's price reduction.8 8 A price reduction that pro-
vokes no response and diverts no sales has no impact on the
price cutter's rivals. The presence of diversion thus indicates
that a price reduction has had some impact on rival firms, but
does not necessarily reveal the extent of the impact nor the ef-
fect on competition in the market. Diversion, then, is a begin-
ning and not an end of analysis. Its occurrence indicates some
market impact, but further inquiry is required to assess the sig-
nificance of that impact.
B. THE APPARENT RESURGENCE OF SALES DIVERSION IN
MARYLAND BAKING AND ITS PROGENY
Beginning in 1956 with Maryland Baking Co.8 9 and ex-
tending into the early 1960s, the Commission decided a number
of cases which superficially appear to reembrace a sales-diver-
sion test of price discrimination. In Maryland Baking Co., the
respondent, a national seller of ice cream cones, had substan-
tially increased its sales in the Washington and Baltimore ar-
eas. As a result of respondent's price cuts, the market share in
rolled cones of its only rival in those marketing areas was re-
duced from 91.3% to 58.2%.90 The respondent, attempting to
turn its rival's market-share loss to its advantage, contended
that the effect of its price cut "was to terminate a monopoly
and create a competitive market."91 Moreover, the local rival
appeared to have remained a viable business firm that had par-
tially offset its losses in sales to jobbers by increased sales to
retailers, and had increased its total business by selling choco-
late rolled sugar cones to ice cream manufacturers. The Com-
mission, however, rejected the contention that the respondent's
incursions made the market more competitive. It did this be-
cause the respondent was substantially larger in size than its
86. See note 110 infra.
87. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
88. See also E. CHAMBERLin, THE THEORY OF MONOPOUSTIC COMPETrION
89-94 (8th ed. 1962) (discussion of the complex price relationships sometimes
existing between rival sellers).
89. 52 F.T.C. 1679 (1956), modified and aff'd, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.), order
modified, 53 F.T.C. 1106 (1957).
90. See id. at 1688, 1689.
91. Id. at 1689. Cf. National Numbering Machine Co., 30 F.T.C. 139, 140
(1938) (a new entrant utilizing quantity and other discount pricing to break




one local competitor and because the local firm's loss of sales
indicated that it lacked "a monopolistic hold on the market."92
When later explaining its finding of competitive injury in Mary-
land Baking Co., the Commission stated that "the primary fac-
tors considered by the Commission in its determination were
loss of sales and a decline in the injured competitor's share of
the market. '93 A crucial factor, however, in the Commission's
competitive-injury finding was that the rival had lost the entire
jobber market to the respondent. If primary attention is fo-
cused on the reduction in the rival's local-market share from
91.3% to 58.2%, the case would appear to be an example of an
extreme attachment to sales diversion as a criterion of competi-
tive injury sufficient to override the seemingly procompetitive
transformation of the market from a one-seller to a two-seller
market. But an accurate reading of the case indicates that the
reduction in local "market" sales by the local monopolist from
91.3% to 58.2% was effected by the respondent's acquisition of
nearly the entire jobber market for rolled sugar cones. Al-
though the reduction in market share from 91.3% to 58.2% was
a reduction of the percentage of total sales made by the local
seller in the combined local markets, this decrease was caused
by pricing activities that gave the respondent itself a monopoly
of the local jobber market. The decision, accordingly, should be
read as attributing significance to the impact of the discrimina-
tion on the jobber market-as saying, in effect, that the Com-
mission's finding of anticompetitive tendencies occurred in a
context in which a discriminating seller abrogated to itself an
entire identifiable market through price discrimination. When
read in that light, Maryland Baking Co. is not a pure "diver-
sion" case; rather, it is a case that looks beyond diversion into
the resulting market impact of the diversion.94
C. ANHEUSER-BUSCH: SALES DIVERSION IN TRANSITION
If the Maryland Baking Co. decision is read as unduly em-
phasizing sales diversion, the Commission's Anheuser-Busch
decision 95 of the following year can be viewed as playing the
role of a transitional case. In that case, the respondent,
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., examined its marketing areas in an ef-
92. 52 F.T.C. at 1689.
93. Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710, 748 (1965), affd in part and rev'd in part,
395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968).
94. See text accompanying notes 117-130 infra.
95. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), rev'd, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir.
1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), ordered vacated, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
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fort to expand sales and, after an initial, unsuccessful experi-
ment in Ohio,96 concluded that the possibilities for increasing
profits through price reductions and increased sales volume
were greatest in the St. Louis marketing area where its plant
was located. Since its distribution system enabled it to reach
retailers in St. Louis directly, Anheuser-Busch did not have to
depend on wholesalers passing on its price reductions to their
own customers in order to increase the volume of its sales.97
When Anheuser-Busch, in order to take advantage of these
market conditions, reduced prices in the St. Louis marketing
area in two stages, from a "premium" level to the "non-
premium" level of its major rivals in that area, it attracted a
large shift of sales-a shift which was not reversed until rees-
tablishment of the premium differential after eight months of
reduced prices.98 The Commission condemned Anheuser-
Busch's St. Louis price reduction in an opinion that empha-
sized the diversionary effect caused by the local price reduc-
tions.99
The examiner's remark that "death" or "mayhem" probably
would have been inflicted on one or more rivals of Anheuser-
Busch if the latter's "price raid had continued longer or indefi-
nitely"'10 0 suggests that he was employing an evaluation stan-
dard that involved more than market-share shifts. It also
suggests that he was assessing temporary discrimination as if
its effects were permanent.101 On review, the Commission lim-
ited itself to sales diversion as the basis for showing anticom-
petitive impact, 0 2 and it defined diversion as a substantial shift
96. Earlier, Anheuser-Busch had passed along increased labor costs by
raising the price of its beer. In many areas, its price increases were multiplied
by wholesalers' and retailers' markups so that the increase in price at the retail
level substantially exceeded the amount of Anheuser-Busch's price increase at
the brewery. When the company attempted, experimentally, to roll back its
price increase in Ohio, it found that its distributors "were unwilling to give up
their total additional markup of $1.20 per case merely because AB reduced its
price 15c per case." Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FrC, 289 F.2d 835, 838 (7th Cir.
1961).
97. Id. at 838.
98. Id. at 839.
99. See 54 F.T.C. at 300.
100. Id. at 291. See also Borden Co., 64 F.T.C. 534, 568, rev'd, 339 F.2d 953
(7th Cir. 1964).
101. By contrast, the Court of Appeals, in its second opinion, focused
largely upon the "temporary" nature of Anheuser-Busch's price reductions and
consequent shifts of business. See 289 F.2d at 839.
102. The Commission ignored Anheuser-Busch's reestablishment of the
premium differential in that part of its opinion that dealt with the section 2(a)
charge and, accordingly, avoided explicit comment upon the temporary nature
of the discrimination. Its silence indicated, however, that it was taking an ap-
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in market shares. 10 3 Such a definition of diversion differs sig-
nificantly from the Moss opinion's concept of diversion as cap-
turing or retaining specific sales. If the Commission, in
Anheuser-Busch, could be read as equating diversion with sub-
stantial market-share shifts that are likely to be permanent, its
approach is partially compatible with the Seventh Circuit's po-
sition in Minneapolis-Honeywell, where the fluidity of market
shares was used as a factor indicative of healthy competition. 1° 4
It would also be compatible with Maryland Baking Co., where
market-share shifts were the principal basis for the Commis-
sion's decision.10 5
Moreover, in addition to diversion, other factors may have
been involved in the Commission's condemnation of Anheuser-
Busch's St. Louis price reduction, which were not mentioned in
the opinion. 0 6 The Commission noted that Anheuser-Busch
maintained a price differential between the widely-advertised
"Budweiser" brand and the "non-premium" brands of local and
regional rivals in nearly all of its markets except St. Louis. In-
deed, it was the elimination of the differential in St. Louis while
maintaining it elsewhere that, according to the Commission,
constituted the "discrimination.' ' 0 7 Anheuser-Busch's behav-
ior thus bore a striking resemblance to a type of pricing toward
which the Commission had previously evidenced some degree
of hostility: a multi-market seller's departure from standard
pricing in one particular market, with resultant substantial
harm to its local rivals. 0 8 Such a pricing pattern closely resem-
bles that of the classic predator described in the 1914 legislative
proach on this question not unlike that of the hearing examiner. The correct
approach, however, would be to project the impact of discrimination in those
circumstances in which the discrimination, in the absence of Commission ac-
tion, appears likely to be permanently maintained or to be frequently repeated.
See text accompanying notes 197-209 infra.
The Commission did refer to Anheuser-Busch's price increase of March
1955, which reestablished a differential between the price of Budweiser and the
prices of "nonpremium" beers, when it considered Anheuser-Busch's section
2(b) defense. 54 F.T.C. at 301-02.
103. Id. at 299-300.
104. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786, 790 (7th Cir.
1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). See note 60 supra. Accord, Yale &
Towne Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1580, 1598, 1602 (1956), quoted at note 83 supra.
105. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
106. See note 102 supra.
107. 54 F.T.C. at 298.
108. See, e.g., Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 F.T.C. 943 (1958); Maryland Bak-
ing Co., 52 F.T.C. 1679 (1956), modified and affd, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957),
order modified, 53 F.T.C. 1106 (1957); American Brake Shoe Co., 52 F.T.C. 484
(1955).
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history'0 9 and, even in the absence of a predatory purpose by
the discriminator, the Commission has remained sensitive to
the disproportionate impact of such pricing on local rivals.110
The resemblance is not perfect, however. Not only was no
predatory motivation shown, but the pricing in other markets
was not uniform. In addition to varying its prices from market
to market, Anheuser-Busch did not always maintain a price dif-
ferential over local and regional rivals."' Furthermore, its ma-
jor rivals in St. Louis were also not confined to that market.112
Yet, it seems probable that the Commission was influenced by
some or all of the following aspects of the Anheuser-Busch case:
(i) Anheuser-Busch's rivals did significant shares of their total
businesses in St. Louis; (ii) as a result, the conditions of the St.
Louis market affected them disproportionately; (iii) Anheuser-
Busch maintained the price differential over nonpremium
brands in a large proportion of its markets; (iv) the elimination
of that differential in St. Louis appeared to be a departure from
its usually observed normal pricing behavior; and (v) the Com-
mission may have thought that Anheuser-Busch's St. Louis
prices were in some way "subsidized" by its revenues from
other markets."13
Anheuser-Busch had a long history of litigation in the
courts. 1 4 The Seventh Circuit finally set aside the Commis-
sion's cease-and-desist order largely on the grounds that the
shifts of business that had occurred were merely temporary,
and that competitive injury could not be established by tempo-
109. See text accompanying note 1 supra. See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 1961).
110. See Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 F.T.C. 943 (1958); American Brake
Shoe Co., 52 F.T.C. 484 (1955).
111. On the basis of an Anheuser-Busch survey used by the Commission, it
appears that a differential existed between Budweiser and its regional and lo-
cal rivals in approximately 90% of the survey's price comparisons. In a sam-
pling of 78 major marketing areas, considered by the company to be a
representative cross-section of the United States, increments of five cents or
more per bottle over regional and local beers were found in 88.6% of the com-
parisons and increments of "up to" ten cents per bottle over local beers were
found in 53.2% of the comparisons. 54 F.T.C. at 280. The absence of differen-
tials in some price comparisons may have been due to regional or local beer
producers asking "premium" prices for their own product. If, in a given market,
Budweiser were priced at a level of approximately five cents above most re-
gional and local beers, Anheuser-Busch could not both maintain the general
five-cent differential and also prevent any one regional beer producer from in-
creasing its own price to the Budweiser level.
112. See 289 F.2d at 837.
113. See the examiner's findings 21 and 26, 54 F.T.C. at 287-88, 290-91.
114. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), rev'd, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir.
1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), order vacated, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
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rary shifts of business." 5 Implicitly, the court appeared to
adopt the view that substantial and potentially permanent mar-
ket-share shifts would be at least partial indicia of competitive
injury. Because the court felt that Anheuser-Busch employed
its "competitive power" with "restraint,"" 6 it found that future
adverse effects from the company's price reductions were un-
likely.
D. BORDEN 1. A MARKET STRUCTURE INTERPRETATION
The Commission's 1964 decision in Borden Co. (Borden
I) 117 is similar to its decision in Maryland Baking Co." 8 On a
superficial reading of the case the Commission seems to be re-
verting to a simple diversion test of competitive injury, but on a
more intensive analysis the case is explainable in terms of the
impact of the discrimination on market structure. In Borden I,
the Commission also partially clarified its approach to the is-
sue, which had been raised in Anheuser-Busch, of how tempo-
rary diversions of sales should be assessed and of how, if at all,
such diversions might be related to market structure. In Bor-
den I, the Commission appeared to say that in assessing the
lawfulness of a firm's discriminatory pricing, rival firms' lost
sales are significant even if their profits are not reduced." 9 In
that case a large grocery store in an Indiana city started a price
war by reducing the price of two brands of milk from 29 to 25
cents per half gallon and later reducing that price to 10 cents.
In response to the first price cut, Borden Company reduced its
price to the rival A & P store, to which it sold directly, from 32.3
cents to 22.2 cents. It responded to the second cut by reducing
its price to A & P to a below-average-cost level of 9.2 cents, a
price which it maintained for one week. Borden also insisted
that its local distributor, Quality Dairy, resell Borden milk to
local grocery store customers at a price of 10 cents per half gal-
lon. As a result of Borden's price reductions, the wholesale
sales of Quality Dairy of its own house brand, which Quality
continued to offer at 37 cents, were completely eliminated,120
and the entire wholesale business of the Dean Milk Company's
115. 289 F.2d at 839.
116. Id. at 843.
117. 64 F.T.C. 534 (1964), rev'd, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964). This Borden liti-
gation is referred to as Borden I to distinguish it from a second Borden litiga-
tion in which the ultimate judicial resolution occurred subsequent to the final
judicial resolution of the instant litigation.
118. Text accompanying notes 94-99 supra.
119. See text accompanying note 122 infra.
120. 64 F.T.C. at 567.
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local distributor was lost during the period of Borden's 9.2 cent
price. Quality Dairy, however, did not lose aggregate business;
its losses in "Quality" brand wholesale business volume were
much more than offset by a large increase in sales of Borden
milk.121 Moreover, it received 7 cents per half gallon as a com-
mission for delivering Borden's direct sales to A & P. According
to Commissioner Elman's dissenting opinion, Quality Dairy's
'"profits for the week were apparently greater than normal."'
122
The diversion emphasis of Borden I appears in the Com-
mission's rejection of Borden's assertion that a permanent
change in market shares was necessary to establish the an-
ticompetitive tendencies requisite to a Robinson-Patman viola-
tion.12 3 Relying on the statutory objective of reaching
anticompetitive conduct in its incipiency, the Commission as-
serted that a "continuation" of the respondent's below-cost dis-
criminations "most assuredly would effect a permanent
decrease in the market shares of respondent's competitors."'1 24
It then observed that where there are only a few competitors,
"an effect on one would be reflected in the strength of competi-
tion generally."'12
Although the Commission's finding of competitive injury as
a result of Quality Dairy's loss of its wholesale business could
be read, as Commissioner Elman implicitly suggested in dis-
sent,126 as a statement that sales diversion is significantly an-
ticompetitive even though the competitor who lost sales
retained or enlarged its profits, this would be a superficial inter-
pretation of the case. Quality Dairy's relinquishment of its
wholesale business meant one fewer "brand" of milk in the
wholesale market. Accordingly, even though Quality Dairy, the
wholesale competitor, was not injured by Borden's price cut,
the part of its business that was competitive with Borden in the
wholesale market was transformed into a Borden distributor-
ship. Since only three brands of milk were sold in the local
market, the loss of one brand would likely affect the level of ri-
valry in the marketplace and this likelihood lends added mean-
ing to the Commission's expressed concern about a permanent
reduction in the market shares of the discriminator's rivals.
There is not only a prospect of a permanent shrinkage in the
121. See id. at 579 (Comnm'r Elman, dissenting).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 568.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 569.
126. Id. at 577-79.
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rivals' aggregate market shares, but a prospect of a permanent
reduction in the number of products sold. Moreover, the Com-
mission's concern with market structure is shown by its obser-
vation that an impact on a single firm tends increasingly to
affect competition in general as the number of firms in the mar-
ket decreases.
The Commission's decision in Borden I was reversed by
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that the
discriminatorily low prices of the Borden Company were effec-
tive for only one week, a fact which led the court to conclude
that no substantial injury to competition was possible.127 Ear-
lier, that same court had reversed a Commission decision in
American Oil, 128 a secondary-line case, on the ground that a
two-week period of price cutting resulted in only temporary
shifts of business. The Seventh Circuit and the Commission
both appear to have concluded that a temporary price cut that
causes only a temporary diversionary effect on sales and does
not make a permanent impact on the price cutter's rivals does
not constitute a Robinson-Patman violation. 29 The Commis-
sion, however, appears to have been more ready to extrapolate
future harm premised on a hypothetical extension of tempo-
rary price cutting. 30 In Borden I and American Oil, the cir-
cumstances indicated that a repetition of the temporary price
cuts was improbable. The Seventh Circuit's reversal of the
Commission in those cases was, therefore, an appropriate re-
sult.
127. 339 F.2d 953, 957 (7th Cir. 1964).
128. American Oil Co., 60 F.T.C. 1786 (1962), rev'd, 325 F.2d 101, 106 (7th Cir.
1963), cert denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964).
129. See text accompanying notes 123-24, 127 supra.
130. Thus, in Borden I the Commission supported its conclusion on the po-
tential anticompetitive effects of the respondent's discriminatory price cutting
by remarking that "[a] continuation of the price discrimination here present,
involving sales below cost, most assuredly would effect a permanent decrease
in the market shares of respondent's competitors." 64 F.T.C. at 568. The state-
ment suggests an evaluation of the discrimination by projecting it into the fu-
ture and then assessing the impact on the market. The Commission did
reinforce its position by referring to other matter in the record from which it
drew the inference that the discriminatory price cutting was not an "isolated
instance," might be repeated, and might have been continued so long as neces-
sary to keep Borden's supermarket customer in business. 64 F.T.C. at 570.
Clearly, however, the Commission was much more inclined than the court to
analyze potential market impact by extrapolating present behavior into the fu-
ture.
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IV. LOSS OF PROFITS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TEST OF
COMPETITIVE INJURY
A. THFE RELATION OF Loss OF PROFITS TO DIVERSION
From the beginning, the Commission has viewed loss of
profits by rival firms as an alternative to diversion as a basis for
ascertaining competitive injury.131 Although a price reduction
tends to divert trade away from rivals to the price cutter when
the rivals make no responsive reductions, diversion may be
largely forestalled when the rivals do make responsive reduc-
tions. In such cases, where diversion is not apparent, the im-
pact of the price reduction may-depending on the elasticity of
market demand-be evidenced by reduced profits of the rival
firms. Although rivals' reduced profits show that the price re-
duction has had some impact on those firms, the discovery of
reduced profits does not in itself disclose the extent of that im-
pact nor its ramifications on the market structure. As in the
case in which it is discovered that a price reduction has di-
verted sales away from rivals, the discovery that a price reduc-
tion has had an adverse impact on rivals' profits is a starting
point for an analysis of the likely short- and long-term impact
of the price reduction on the intensity of competition in the
marketplace.13
2
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "SIZE" OF PROFIT MARGINS IN
ASSESSING THE LAWFULNESS OF A DISCRIMINATORY
PRICE REDUCTION
In Forster Manufacturing Co.,'33 the Commission adopted
the secondary-line cases' focus on impairment of the profit
margins of adversely affected firms as an indicator of competi-
tive injury, and utilized that approach in determining primary-
line injury. In that case, the respondent, who had sold ice
cream spoons at different prices to different buyers, defended
its pricing actions by using the traditional criteria of sales di-
version and rivals' loss of sales volume. It presented the rela-
tively sophisticated defense that loss of particular sales by
competitors does not evidence harm to seller's ability to com-
pete unless the seller's reduced sales volume caused such
higher unit costs that he could no longer make a profit at mar-
131. The Commission's focus on loss of profits is discussed, in connection
with the secondary-line cases, in Gifford, Assessing Secondary-Line Injury,
supra note 8, at 62-65.
132. See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra and note 168 infra.
133. 62 F.T.C. 852 (1963), vacated and remanded, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964).
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ket prices, 3 4 or unless the loss of the particular sales caused
the seller to encounter financial difficulties. Furthermore, the
respondent asserted that its own sales declined during the year
of the discriminatory pricing and that it sold fewer spoons than
two of its major competitors during that year. Moreover, the re-
spondent claimed that both of its competitors "were them-
selves engaged in cutting prices to get the business of other
buyers, i.e., that there was a general 'price war' going on,' 35
and that as a result one account which the respondent had ob-
tained through price cutting was reacquired by the original
holder of the account by a low bid.
The Commission rejected these arguments, however, pri-
marily on the ground that "they attach too much significance to
sales volume."'1 36 Instead, the Commission believed that harm
to other sellers should be measured by loss of profits rather
than by lost sales volume. Here the Commission focused on
the "substantiality" of a price discrimination, which it said is
measured by "its size in relation to the profit margins of the
parties allegedly affected by it.' 37 Citing Corwin Edwards' dis-
cussion of secondary-line injury13 and two secondary-line
cases for support, 39 the Commission based its rationale on the
increasing significance that firms place on each dollar of profit
or loss as the margin between prices and "actual costs" de-
creases. 40 The Commission then concluded that a '"price
war"-which, it had asserted, drives prices downward toward
actual costs-heightens the probability that a discrimination
will injure competing sellers. By substituting injury to compet-
ing sellers for the substantiality of price discrimination, the
Commission appeared to be equating the two factors. When
there is a "substantial" discrimination, there is injury to com-
134. 62 F.T.C. at 902. This argument finds requisite harm when the rivals
are experiencing average costs that decline with increases in output and when
the respondent's discriminatorily low prices divert sufficient volume away from
the rivals to force their operations to higher points on their average-cost curves.
Such conditions occurred, or were thought by the court to have occurred, in
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249-50 (1951), and Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v.
Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 956 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 843 (1960).
135. 62 F.T.C. at 902.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 904.
138. C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 234 (1959).
139. Whitaker Cable Corp., 239 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1956); E. Edelnann & Co. v.
FTC, 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956). But see Fred Bronner Corp., 57 F.T.C. 771, 783
(1960), regarding the significance of narrow profit margins in secondary-line
cases.
140. 62 F.T.C. at 904.
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petitors; a discrimination becomes "substantial" when it is
large in relation to the profit margins of the discriminator's
competitors.
The "size" of a price discrimination is the amount by which
prices to some buyers differ from prices to other buyers.141 In
assessing secondary-line harm, a comparison of the size of a
discrimination to the profit margins of unfavored buyers makes
some economic sense. The smaller the profit margins are in re-
lation to the size of a discrimination, the less able are the disfa-
vored buyers to meet the resale prices of favored rivals who
pass on the price differential in their own resale prices.
42
When the size of the discrimination equals or exceeds the
profit margins of the disfavored buyers, the latter will be un-
able to meet the resale prices of their favored rivals who pass
on the price differential in their resale prices.
This general approach can be applied to an assessment of
primary-line injury. But in the terms in which the Commission
has formulated its test-a comparison of the size of the dis-
crimination with the profit margins of adversely affected
firms-it has limited applicability. It would apply, as in Forster,
to cases in which the discrimination was nongeographical and
aimed at taking away particular, identifiable accounts from the
discriminator's rivals. In such a situation, the discriminator's
rivals could compete only by offering equivalently low prices to
those accounts. As the size of the discrimination becomes large
in relation to the rival sellers' profit margins, however, these ri-
val sellers would be able to meet those prices only by incurring
profit reductions of increasing amounts on those sales. As the
size of the discrimination equaled or exceeded the profit mar-
gins of the rival sellers, the latter would be able to meet those
prices and compete only by sacrificing their profits or by incur-
ring losses on those sales.
Many primary-line cases, however, involve geographic dis-
crimination; the Commission's formulation cannot be literally
applied to this type of case. Since the size of a geographic dis-
crimination would be measured by the difference between the
141. See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960). The size of
price discriminations can be compared directly to profit margins of secondary-
line buyers or primary-line competitors if it is assumed that all prices are ini-
tially at a uniform market level.
142. The Commission thus viewed as significant the ratio of the amount by
which rivals' prices are undercut to the size of rivals' preexisting profit mar-
gins. Narrow profit margins of rivals were deemed a significant factor in later
primary-line cases as well. E.g., Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710, 750 (1965), affid in
par4 rev'd in part, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968).
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discriminating seller's prices in two areas, it has no relation to
the profit margins of the discriminator's competitors in any par-
ticular locality. For example, a sizeable discrepancy could exist
between the prices at which a firm sells its products in the
northeastern and southeastern parts of the United States. Yet,
if the firm is selling at the prevailing market prices in each
area, its price discrimination has no adverse effect on its local
competitors in either area. Even if the local competitors in the
area in which the lower prices prevailed operated at narrow
profit margins and the amount of discrimination were greater
than those margins, no harm would result.
If the profit-margin focus is to be applied to primary-line
cases involving geographic discrimination, the Commission's
formulation must be reworked. The Commission's basic intui-
tion is that the effects of a discriminatorily low price will be
more serious for those competitors of a discriminator whose
preexisting prices were close to or below their costs than when
the discriminatorily low prices are substantially above the
costs of the discriminator's competitors. To apply the Commis-
sion's Forster approach to geographic discrimination, it would
be necessary to restate it: the extent to which a firm undercuts
its competitors through a discriminatory price cut is to be com-
pared to the profit margins of those competitors in assessing
the anticompetitive tendencies of discriminatory pricing. For-
ster's focus on profit margins could be viewed as a movement
toward a more productive approach to the evaluation of pri-
mary-line harm if it is interpreted as being concerned with the
potential impact of the respondent's pricing behavior upon the
abilities of rivals to compete and, hence, upon the permanent
market structure. If profit margins are decreased temporarily
on a few accounts or even on all accounts, no permanent injury
to rivals is likely to occur and thus no permanent reduction in
the level of marketplace rivalry will result.
The Commission's adoption of the profit-margin approach
of its secondary-line cases makes sense because its intended
focus is upon the economic harm inflicted by the discriminator
upon its rivals. Although this newer approach is not without
problematic aspects,143 Forster was another milestone on the
143. An examination of comparative profit margins may not always ade-
quately reflect the impact of the discrimination. In the obvious case in which
local industry demand is elastic, a discriminating seller who responds to that
demand may force local prices down, narrowing every firm's profit margins.
But the narrowing of profit margins may be offset by increased sales volume, so
that all firms earn larger profits. Again, profit margins of rivals may be
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road away from a Moss-type diversion approach. 144 In Forster,
the Commission, by criticizing the respondent's defense as
overemphasizing diversion and by calling instead for an exami-
nation of profit margins, seemed to be looking for real-rather
than constructive-injury to rivals, and appeared to be search-
ing for that harm which would affect the viability of the com-
petitive forces in the market in which the discriminator is
selling.
V. THE GENERALIZATIONS OF FRY AND DEAN
A. THE DECISION IN Fry
Further criteria governing primary-line competitive injury
were articulated by the Commission in Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co.145 In that case, the respondent, followed by other national
manufacturers of roofing material, set Knoxville, Tennessee,
the plant site of a local southeastern roofing manufacturer that
did not conform to an industry-observed pricing pattern, as a
basing point,146 and dropped the Knoxville base price to a level
below the local manufacturer's costs.147 There was no evi-
dence, however, that the Knoxville price was below the respon-
dent's costs.' 48  The decision-which condemned the
respondent's pricing action-seems fully justified on the basis
of the respondent's predatory intent.149 Indeed, the Commis-
sion found that the respondent's purpose in lowering its Knox-
ville price was to discipline the local seller for its deviant
pricing. 50 But the Commission chose not to rely on predatory
intent' 5 ' and, instead, directly addressed the competitive im-
pact of the local cuts. In so doing, the Commission appeared to
squeezed when a multi-market seller offers his goods locally at a marginal-cost
price. Yet, powerful arguments can be made that this latter conduct is, in many
circumstances, quite proper. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 711, 723. Cf.
Gifford, Price Discrimination and Labelling, 25 BuFrALO L. REV. 395, 406-07
(1976); Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting, supra note 3, at 1090.
144. See text accompanying notes 39-55 supra.
145. 68 F.T.C. 217 (1965), aj.'d, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966).
146. See note 72 supra.
147. 68 F.T.C. at 257.
148. Id. at 266.
149. Id. at 264, 265. Traditionally, the Commission and the courts have used
a finding of predatory intent to infer anticompetitive consequences from a re-
spondent's discriminatory pricing and have thereby dispensed with further eco-
nomic analysis of the consequences of that pricing. See note 3 supra. That
approach, however, has been recently challenged. See Areeda & Turner, supra
note 3. See also text accompanying notes 310-328 infra.
150. Id. at 263. See note 152 infra.
151. Id. at 264, 265.
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be attempting to use the Fry proceeding as a forum for enunci-
ating criteria which would be applicable to a wider class of
cases than those bearing a close factual resemblance to Fry.
Thus, the Commission supported its finding of an anticompeti-
tive tendency by listing five factors: (1) a locally dominant
seller and (2) price leader (3) was setting long-term prices in a
local area (4) at a level below the average cost of some local
producers (5) while selling at higher prices elsewhere. 152
It should be observed that these statements were made by
the Commission in an opinion that recognized that there was
"no allegation of substantial injury to competition generally
other than that which would result from injury to individual
competitors.' 53 The Commission thus was apparently apply-
ing the language of the Act which outlaws price discrimination
"where the effect of such discrimination may be ... to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who ...
grants ... such discrimination .... -154 In applying this
clause, the Commission rejected a superficial diversion theory
of injury such as that employed by the Second Circuit in
Moss.155 Indeed, the Commission quoted the then-recent opin-
ion of the Seventh Circuit in Anheuser-Busch to the effect that
section 2(a) "is not concerned with mere shifts of business be-
tween competitors," and construed the clause in question as
being concerned "with injury to the health or vigor of competi-
tion, including injury to a single firm's ability to compete.' '15 6
Despite the permeation of much of the opinion with a market-
structure approach toward the evaluation of competitive injury,
the five factors listed by the Commission must be read in the
explicitly stated context of applying the Act's competitive in-
jury clause to injury to a single competitor.
152. We believe that the showing that Fry, as the price leader and domi-
nant competitive factor in the sale of roofing products in the area
served by Volasco and Ohio Paper Company, has discriminated in
price by selling asphalt felt in that area at prices below the price at
which these two smaller firms could profitably operate and has main-
tained its prices at or about this level for more than two years, while
selling at substantially higher prices elsewhere, is sufficient to estab-
lish a violation of Section 2(a).
68 F.T.C. at 263. The Commission bolstered its opinion by finding that Fry's
price reductions were made "for the purpose of disciplining small independent
concerns .... ." Id. The significance of this latter finding was weakened by the
Commission's decision not to rely on the hearing examiner's finding of preda-
tory intent in predictng the future effects of Fry's price discrimination.
153. 68 F.T.C. at 250-51.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). See notes 8-9 supra.
155. See 68 F.T.C. at 260. See text accompanying notes 34-55 supra.
156. 68 F.T.C. at 260.
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B. A LIMITED CRITIQUE OF THE FRY STANDARDS
All but the third of the five factors listed by the Commis-
sion in Fry5 7 could have been applied to the Borden I facts to
justify that decision. 5 8 The third factor, the maintenance of lo-
cally discriminatory prices "for more than two years," has been
translated as "long-term" discriminatory prices. 159 Since the
discrimination in Fry did last more than two years, the Com-
mission's reference to this lengthy period can be viewed as de-
scriptive, and not necessarily as a withdrawal from its earlier
position in Borden I that a temporary (one-week) price cut
could satisfy the requirements for finding the anticompetitive
tendency essential for a Robinson-Patman violation. 160 Yet, in
Fry, the Commission explicitly adopted the Seventh Circuit's
view that mere shifts of business do not constitute competitive
injury. The adoption of this view suggests that the Commission
referred to the two-year duration of the discrimination in order
to show that the discrimination in question was likely to have
produced permanent effects.' 6 ' In this case the permanent ef-
fect was the potential crippling of Fry's two local competitors in
the Knoxville area.
The Commission's concern in Fry with the fact that the
discriminator's prices were below the average costs of rival sell-
ers echoed its concern in Forster with the rival sellers' profit
margins.162 In each case, the Commission took an approach
that was plausibly traditional, not in the sense of the earlier
Moss/diversion line of cases, but in the sense of relationship to
the historic concerns of the enacting Congresses. Both the
Commission and Congress were concerned about the vigor and
health of independent firms. They were concerned that these
firms be protected not from the stresses of normal competition
157. See text accompanying note 152 supra; Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 68
F.T.C. 217, 263 (1965), affid, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966).
158. See text accompanying notes 117-130 supra.
159. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
160. See text accompanying notes 110-122 supra.
161. The Seventh Circuit, in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840
(7th Cir. 1961), asserted that the Act is not concerned with "mere shifts of busi-
ness" among competitors and emphasized the "temporary" nature of these
shifts. Id. at 835, 839. Skepticism that short periods of discrimination could
produce potentially anticompetitive effects on the market was also demon-
strated by the Seventh Circuit in Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 953, 957 (7th Cir.
1964). See also American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101, 106 (7th Cir. 1963).
Against this background, the Commission's incorporation of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's Anheuser-Busch language seems designed to emphasize the prolonged
period of the Fry discrimination. See 68 F.T.C. at 260, 263.
162. See notes 133-144 supra.
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where the race is won or lost on the basis of efficiency but from
"unfair" competitive conditions 163 in which a locally efficient
firm can be driven from the market by a less efficient discrimi-
nator through discriminatory pricing.
Both Fry and Forster serve to sharpen and to focus these
historic perceptions. The legislative and enforcement histories
of section 2 are replete with hostile references to firms' selling
below cost or at prices which produce abnormally low profits.164
Many of these references reflect the image of the classic
predator that gave rise to the original section 2.165 Other refer-
ences reflect the concern of the amending Congress with be-
low-cost sales by producers to favored buyers. 16 6 The
contribution of Forster and Fry is to reinforce the notion that
competitive injury-if it exists-lies in adverse effects on rivals.
The issue of whether the discriminator sells below his own
costs (however "costs" are defined) 167 may be relevant to the
assessment of the motivation of the discriminator or to his con-
formity with a competitive-market norm. The injury (or poten-
tial injury), however, is measured primarily by the impact of
the discriminator's conduct on his rivals.168 When rivals are
forced to sell at or below their costs, they cannot continue in
business indefinitely.169 Of course, a firm normally should not
be prevented from selling at or below the costs of its rivals
when it is in its short-run profit-maximizing (or loss-minimiz-
ing) interest to do S0.170 But if the competitive contest among
163. See Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting, supra note 3, at 1046, 1049, 1062-
64. See also H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914), quoted at text ac-
companying note 1 supra.
164. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914). See also Gifford,
Promotional Price-Cutting, supra note 3, at 1047-49; Gifford, Assessing Secon-
dary-Line Injury, supra note 8, at 49-52.
165. See note 163 supra.
166. See Gifford, Assessing Secondary-Line Injury, supra note 8, at 49-52.
167. See text accompanying notes 308-313 infra.
168. This, indeed, is the one valid aspect of Moss. If there is no sales diver-
sion or other adverse impact upon the profits of rivals, the discrimination is
known, a fortiori, to have had no market impact, and further analysis is unnec-
essary. Forster and Fry are reminders that market analyses of the potential
impact of discriminatory pricing should have as a first step an assessment of
the impact of that pricing on other firms.
169. See, e.g., J. DUE, INTERMEDIATE ECONOMIC ANALYsis 230 (rev. ed. 1950).
170. Short-run profit maximization is the behavior norm underlying theoret-
ical models of competition. See Gifford, Price Discrimination and Labelling,
supra note 143, at 406-07 (1976). Professor Scherer has argued that pricing be-
havior that conforms to short-run profit maximization may not always advance
long-run social welfare. See Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act:
A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REV. 869, 885-87 (1976). See also R. PosNE, ANTrrRUST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 189 (1976).
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rivals is to promote efficient operations, a firm should not be al-
lowed to force its rivals into unprofitable operations when (i) it
is enabled to do so by discriminatory pricing and when (ii) its
low prices are not justified by its own short-run profit-maximiz-
ing interest.171
C. THE DECISION IN DEAN
Dean Milk Co.,172 another primary-line case decided by the
Commission during the 1960s, climaxed the Commission's halt-
ing development of a market-oriented approach to primary-line
injury. That case involved territorial price differentials main-
tained by the respondent Dean, a milk producer, during its en-
try into the market in several cities in eastern Kentucky.
Although a significant amount of Dean's pricing was found to
have been at below-cost levels, 7 3 the Commission indicated
that it would tolerate some below-cost discriminatory pricing
during periods of limited duration in which a seller was enter-
ing new markets, presumably on the ground that entry is gen-
erally procompetitive17 4 Dean's pricing was faulted by the
Commission, however, because its discriminations exceeded
the Commission's limits of toleration for market-entry situa-
tions1 75 and because the Commission attributed the demise of
a number of local rivals to Dean's discriminatory pricing.1 7 6
Although the Dean decision is yet another example of a
Commission determination of primary-line injury that was re-
versed on appeal, 7 7 its articulation of a developed market ap-
proach to primary-line injury is important. In Dean, the
Commission employed alternative tests of diversion or loss-of-
profits as a starting point. It then qualified these initial tests by
requiring that the diversion or loss-of-profits must portend one
of three results: (1) a financial crippling of the affected compet-
itors, (2) a possibility of an anticompetitive concentration of
business in large sellers, or (3) a significant reduction in the
171. See discussion in Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting, supra note 3, at
1058-60. But compare Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 711, 727, with id.
172. Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710 (1965), affid in part, rev'd in part, 395 F.2d
696 (7th Cir. 1968).
173. See 68 F.T.C. at 771 & n.115, 774.
174. Id. at 775 n.147.
175. Id. See also Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting, supra note 3, at 1080-
81.
176. 68 F.T.C. at 774.
177. See Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710 (1965), affd in part, rev'd in part, 395
F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968); Borden Co., 64 F.T.C. 534 (1964), rev'd, 339 F.2d 953 (7th
Cir. 1964); Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), rev'd 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir.
1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), order vacated, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
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number of sellers in the market. The Commission added that
diversion or loss-of-profits gives sufficient cause to find a les-
sening of competition if it should herald (a) a trend toward fur-
ther losses of business and profits, and (b) an increased
concentration of business in fewer sellers or a reasonable pos-
sibility that some sellers will be driven out of business.1
78 If
the two statements are read together, Dean might be construed
as saying that a determination that business has been diverted
away from the discriminator's rivals or that the rivals have suf-
fered a loss of profits is the first step in finding the anticompeti-
tive tendency requisite for a section 2(a) violation. Once the
first step is satisfied, the diversion or loss of profits must por-
tend a trend toward further losses of business or profits, a
trend that must include the possibility of concentrating busi-
ness in larger sellers, or the possibility of eliminating a signifi-
cant number of sellers from the market. Language in the
opinion suggests that the elimination of any number of compet-
itors from the market, regardless of the economic significance
of those competitors, would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory
anticompetitive-tendency requirement. The totality of the lan-
guage used, however, suggests otherwise. 7 9
The discussion in Dean of primary-line injury standards
reemphasizes the Commission's insistence in Yale & Towne
Manufacturing Co. 180 on maintaining a competitive market
structure. Dean also provides a synthesis in which the post-
Yale & Towne cases can be included. In Forster, the Commis-
sion rejected respondent's arguments showing that the rivals
were able to continue their operations. 181 Such arguments
were rejected, not because the continued viability of competi-
tors was deemed irrelevant, but because the respondent had
framed its arguments in terms of the actual impact of its dis-
crimination on rivals rather than in terms of the potential im-
pact if continued for a long term.182 Forster's arguments
disregarded the Commission's tendency to project 83 the effect
of discrimination. The Dean criteria are phrased in terms of
portents for the future rather than as actual occurrences in the
present or past. Thus, it is possible to read the post-Yale &
178. 68 F.T.C. at 750.
179. See id. at 750, 774-75.
180. 52 F.T.C. 1580 (1956). See text accompanying note 83 supra.
181. Forster Mfg. Co., 62 F.T.C. 852, 902, 904 (1963), vacated and remanded,
335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964). See text accompanying notes 133-144 supra.
182. 62 F.T.C. at 904-05.
183. See text accompanying notes 100-102, 122-130 supra, 199-209, 214, 244,
353, 355-357 infra.
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Toume cases together as saying that when a seller, through dis-
criminatory pricing, is able to force into unprofitable operations
a number of its rivals whose absence from the market would
significantly increase the level of market concentration, there is
likely to be primary-line injury. The Forster decision adds a
further refinement, that of challenging discriminatory pricing
that "squeezes" rivals' profit margins sufficiently to portend the
demise of a significant number of them.184 Of course, in a mar-
ket with few sellers, significance will attach to the continued
profitable operations of each seller.185
VI. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO PRIMARY-LINE INJURY
In the courts, primary-line injury has been established
most often in cases involving predatory behavior and in cases
involving "below-cost" pricing that-properly or not-was per-
ceived by the courts as predatory.186 In cases involving non-
predatory conduct, the courts have evidenced a substantial
evolution. In the 1940s and 1950s, the courts did not distinguish
themselves for their perspicuity in handling allegations of pri-
mary-line competitive injury, except in contexts involving obvi-
ously predatory behavior.187 Although a number of cases were
decided as if they involved predatory behavior, the courts' at-
tempts to fit the defendants' conduct into the mold of the clas-
sic predator seem unconvincing. 188 In other cases, defendants
whose behavior seems suspect were absolved by the courts in
analyses that demonstrated an unfamiliarity with the underly-
184. See text accompanying notes 129-136 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 345-348 infra.
186. See Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954); Continen-
tal Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97, 104 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277, 282 (7th
Cir. 1966); Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 F.2d 906 (1965); E.B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 518 (6th Cir. 1944).
See also National Dairy Prods. Co. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605, 618 (7th Cir. 1969);
Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234, 237
(2nd Cir. 1929).
187. Thus, for example, in Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel
Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960), the court
failed to appreciate the impact of scale economies in the production of cinder
block. That failure caused it to miss the socially beneficial aspects of the de-
fendant's marginal-cost pricing. In Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co.,
231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), the court failed to analyze why the defendant's dis-
criminatory price cut-which apparently moved it from a profit to a loss posi-
tion-was not predatorily motivated.




ing economic issues. 189 The sophistication of the federal judici-
ary in dealing with Robinson-Patman issues, however, has
gradually increased over time. Recently, a number of reported
decisions have exhibited a relatively high level of analytical
competence. 19
0
Since the late 1950s the courts have exhibited a marked re-
luctance to infer primary-line injury from discriminatory pric-
mng, even when that discrimination has resulted in significant
market-share changes. 19 ' This reluctance appears to be based
on judicial expectations that firms-especially large ones-are
capable of withstanding a certain amount of pressure exerted
189. See Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956).
190. See International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); William Inglis & Sons Bak-
ing Co. v. IT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Calif. 1978).
191. See Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968); Borden Co. v.
FTC, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964); Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964),
rev'd, 383 U.S. 637 (1966), on remand, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), order
vacated, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961). But see Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond
Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959).
This judicial reluctance to find primary-line injury has frequently been il-
lustrated in appellate reversals of Commission or jury determinations of pri-
mary-line Robinson-Patman violations. See cases cited supra. In a number of
these cases, the court of appeals has itself been reversed by the Supreme
Court, but on remand, has found other grounds for reinstating its reversal of
the Commission or jury. This scenario was followed in the Anheuser-Busch,
Borden II, and Utah Pie cases. See Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 349
F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 386 U.S. 685 (1967), on remand, 396 F.2d 161 (10th
Cir. 1965); Borden Co., 62 F.T.C. 130 (1963), rev'd, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964),
rev'd, 383 U.S. 637 (1966), on remand, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), rev'd, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363
U.S. 536 (1960), order vacated, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961). Commission deter-
minations of primary-line violations were also reversed in Borden I and Dean
Milk Co. See Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710 (1965), rev'd on primary-line injury
question and otherwise affid, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1969); Borden Co., 64 F.T.C.
534, rev'd, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964). In addition, Commission determinations
of primary-line violations-when they have been upheld-have tended to be
upheld on the narrow ground that the respondent's conduct was predatorily
motivated, rather than on the broader grounds on which the Commission had
rested its decision. See Forster Mfg. Co., 62 F.T.C. 852, 903-04, vacated on other
grounds and remanded, 335 F.2d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906
(1965). See also Maryland Baking Co., 52 F.T.C. 1679 (1956), modified and af'd,
243 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1957). Contra, National Dairy Prods. Corp., 71 F.T.C.
1333, 1427 (1967), modified and enforced, 412 F.2d 605, 618 (7th Cir. 1969). Thus,
in Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966), for example, the
court of appeals upheld the Commission's cease-and-desist order on the narrow
ground that the respondent had acted with predatory intent. It ignored the
Commission's attempt to formulate decisional standards governing primary-
line injury that reached beyond predatory-intent cases. The court also ignored
the Commission's express refusal to base its decision on its finding of preda-
tory intent. Id. at 282.
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by the low prices of their rivals.192
Several other themes have appeared intermittently in the
judicial opinions. First, courts have recognized that a multi-
market firm can be expected to price differently in different
markets because of varying competitive and cost conditions in
those markets. 193 Since prices that differ from market to mar-
ket are, by definition, "discriminatory,"' 94 these courts have
been removing effectively the pejorative connotations from
"discriminatory" pricing. Moreover, they have emphasized that
it is the accuser who must show that the differential prices
work injury in the marketplace, a focus which lessens the need
for the accused firm to explain or to justify its behavior. 195 And
since discriminatory pricing is considered normal and to be ex-
pected, the plaintiff must overcome larger psychological obsta-
cles in establishing the anticompetitive potential of the
discrimination.
A second factor, which nearly all courts have considered to
be highly relevant to a finding of primary-line competitive in-
jury, consists of changes-especially dramatic changes-in
market shares resulting from discriminatorily low pricing. The
cases have tended to say that mere "shifts" in business are not
of concern but are, in fact, unsurprising in a vigorously compet-
itive marketplace. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit's Dean Milk Co.
opinion developed the point that rival firms have no "vested
right" to grow in the proportions indicated by their existing
market shares, and that the "practicalities of competition"
themselves "necessarily result in some competitors growing at
the expense of their smaller or less efficient rivals."' 96 None-
theless, when shifts of business are sufficiently large or perma-
nent as to be best described as shifts of market shares, the
cases have tended to treat them seriously.197 Here is where the
192. See cases cited in notes 191 supra, 193 infra.
193. See Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 701, 702 (7th Cir. 1968);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1961); Balian Ice Cream
Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356, 367 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
991 (1956).
194. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960).
195. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
196. 395 F.2d at 711.
197. See, e.g., cases cited in note 191 supra. Although in most of these cases
the courts of appeals concluded that no primary-line injury had occurred, in
each case, nevertheless, the court found it necesssary to explain why the mar-
ket-share shifts that had occurred did not constitute such injury in the circum-
stances there present. Often these explanations tended to be that the shifts
were only temporary. See text at notes 105, 129-130.
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projection 98 of present events and trends into the future be-
comes relevant.
Although it is the probability of producing an anticompeti-
tive impact on the market that determines the lawfulness of
discriminatory pricing, and although this probability perhaps
should be assessed as of the time-period in which the discrimi-
nation occurs, 199 the courts appear to have freely examined the
market conditions existing in the post-discrimination period in
order best to ascertain the impact of the discrimination. This
question of the proper date on which to assess the anticompeti-
tive potential of discriminatory pricing was a focus of conten-
tion in H. Heinz Co. v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc.20 0 In that
case, plaintiff Heinz argued that at the time defendant Beech-
Nut commenced its discriminatorily low pricing in California
the chances were that Heinz would withdraw from the Califor-
nia market and, consequently, that the pricing should be judg-
ed anticompetitive. Although conceding that an assessment of
probabilities as of that date was proper, Beech-Nut argued that
"subsequent events as ultimately developing should be consid-
ered,' '201 and, hence, that the continued presence of Heinz in
the California market should be considered in assessing the im-
pact of Beech-Nut's pricing on the California market. The court
agreed with Heinz about the time at which the prospective ef-
fects of the price cut should be examined, but did not address
the modification urged by the defendant.20 2 In later cases, how-
ever, reviewing courts have, in fact, assessed the anticompeti-
tive potential of discrimination in the light of subsequent
events.
In the Anheuser-Busch case, the Seventh Circuit divided
the competitive-injury question into two components: (1) ac-
tual competitive injury, and (2) probability of future competi-
tive injury.20 3 The court dealt with the first question by
referring to actual market effects ascertained through an exam-
ination of the market during and after the period in which the
198. See text accompanying notes 100-102, 123-130 supra and notes 199-209,
214, 244, 352, 354-356 infra.
199. The Act contemplates that pricing behavior will be evaluated according
to the probable market effects of that behavior and that the probable effects are
properly assessed at the time of the behavior without the wisdom of hindsight.
See text accompanying note 5 supra and note 202 infra.
200. 181 F. Supp. 452, 462-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
201. Id. at 462.
202. Id. at 464. Because it felt that "the relative competitive strength of the
parties" and the "aggressive" nature of the price cuts needed clarification at
trial, the court denied the motion of the defendant for summary judgment.
203. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 206-207 infra.
[Vol. 64.1
PRIMARY - LINE INJURY
discriminatory prices were in effect. Although the court ob-
served that respondent's local price cut increased its share of
the market from 12.5% prior to the first price reduction to "a
monthly average of 36.6% of sales during the eight months of
the second price reduction," it nevertheless found that this dra-
matic change in market shares did not have any actual an-
ticompetitive effect, because the respondent's share dropped to
17.5% eleven months after the retraction of the second price re-
duction, and because one of its rivals had grown from 29.4%
prior to the initial price cut to 43.2% eleven months after the re-
traction of the second price cut.2° 4 Indeed, the principal differ-
ence between the court's evaluation of the impact of Anheuser-
Busch's price cut 20° and the Commission's evaluation was the
court's incorporation, in its analysis, of the market conditions
during the period following the withdrawal of the second price
cut. Whereas the Commission focused on the dramatic market-
share increase achieved by Anheuser-Busch 2 6 at the point of
the greatest impact of its price cut and largely ignored the state
of the market after the price reduction was withdrawn, the
court focused on the market in the post-reduction period.20 7
The court was able to do this by directing its attention initially
to answering the first of the two questions it proposed. In an-
swering the second question, the court admitted the propriety
of making "a projection to ascertain the future effect"208 of a re-
spondent's past discrimination where such a projection is
based upon predatory behavior. But since the court concluded
that the respondent "exercised a proper restraint in its use of
its competitive power, '20 9 the court refused to project adverse
competitive effects into the future.
A third theme in a number of the decisions is the accept-
ance of business growth of rival firms as negating anticompeti-
tive consequences of discriminatory pricing. It has already
been observed that in the Anheuser-Busch case, the continued
growth of the Falstaff company in the St. Louis market
throughout, and subsequent to, the period of Anheuser-Busch's
discriminatorily low pricing was a factor relied on by the court
as an indication that those prices produced no actual lessening
204. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840, 843 (7th Cir. 1961).
205. 239 F.2d at 839.
206. Id. at 839-40.
207. Compare Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277, 299-301 (1957), with
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 839-40 (7th Cir. 1961).




of competition in that market.210 And in its recent decision in
International Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co.,211
the Fifth Circuit's determination that the defendant's discrimi-
natory pricing produced no injury to seller-level competition
was supported in part by the fact that rival sellers continued
"to exist and even grow as large competitors" of the discrimina-
tor.2 12 In Borden 11,213 the court reasoned that no adverse im-
pact on seller-level competition could be inferred from
Borden's discriminatorily low prices on private-label milk be-
cause Borden's private-label rivals who lost sales to Borden
gained offsetting sales from other sources. Indeed, the affected
rivals had increased their absolute sales volume and had "bet-
tered their market position in approximately the same propor-
tion" as Borden.214 Again, the Commission was more willing
than the court to project Borden's inroads into its rivals' sales
into the future; the court was satisfied that no anticompetitive
impact had occurred because of the rivals' offsetting sales. The
Commission dismissed the significance of the offsetting sales as
caused by a unique set of circumstances which were unlikely
to be repeated.2 15 In Dean Milk Co.,216 the sales expansion of
and the increased profits earned by many of Dean's rivals
played a role in the court's rejection of Commission determina-
tions of primary-line injury.217 The events of the Dean case oc-
curred against a background of changing technology, which was
producing an efficiency advantage in the larger dairies. 2 18 In
such circumstances, the continued growth of many of Dean's ri-
vals suggested to the court that the losses suffered by several
other firms and even the demise of some firms were not caused
by Dean's pricing, but were a result of the increasing inefficien-
cies of those firms.2 19
Finally, the concept of causation has been employed by the
courts to absolve discriminating firms from Robinson-Patman
liability. This applicatinn has been accomplished in two ways.
First, a court may attribute the demise of rival firms to factors
210. Id. at 839. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
211. 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975).
212. Id. at 722 n.14. See also id. at 720.
213. Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967).
214. Id. at 179-80.
215. See Borden Co., 62 F.T.C. at 173.
216. Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968).
217. Id. at 702, 711.
218. See id. at 703, 705-06, 712, 714, Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. 473, 712-13
(1965), modified and affid, 1967 Trade Cas. 72,124 (9th Cir. 1967).
219. 395 F.2d at 711, 712.
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other than the discriminatory prices. This, as observed above,
was the case in Dean Milk Co., in which the court saw techno-
logical changes in production methods as the likely cause of
the failing firms' difficulties. 220 And, in Anheuser-Busch, pro-
duction and management difficulties of two of the discrimina-
tors' rivals were seen by the court as accounting for much of
the long-term shrinkage of their market-shares. 2 21 Second, a
court may find that injury to rival sellers, although "caused" by
discriminatorily low prices, was effected merely by the low
level of the prices and not by their discriminatory aspect: the
discriminator's maintenance of a higher price elsewhere did
not contribute to its ability to price at a low level in the market
at issue.222 In order for the price difference to "cause" competi-
tive injury, under this view, the discriminatorily low prices that
impose adverse operating conditions on the discriminator's ri-
vals would have to be subsidized by the revenues produced by
higher prices elsewhere. This distinction between injury
"caused" by discriminatorily low prices only and injury caused
by discrimination has received substantially more recognition
from the courts than it has from the Commission.223
VII THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW: UTAH PIE
The Supreme Court reached the issue of primary-line stan-
dards in its 1967 decision in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co.224 That case resulted from four years of intense price ri-
valry, beginning in 1958, between Utah Pie Co., a local Salt
Lake City processor of frozen pies, and three national sellers of
frozen pies, each of which was attempting to improve its posi-
tion in the Salt Lake City market. The Salt Lake City prices of
each of the national sellers were shown to be lower than their
prices elsewhere and were found to have fallen occasionally be-
low their average costs of producing and selling in Salt Lake
City.22 5 The Utah Pie Co., which began marketing frozen pies
only in 1957, generally met or undercut the local prices of its
national rivals. But since it operated only in one market-Salt
Lake City-its low prices did not involve it in territorial price
220. Text accompanying note 219 supra.
221. 289 F.2d at 839.
222. See Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1967).
223. See, e.g., id.- Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 703-04 (9th
Cir. 1964); Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 224 F. Supp. 922, 925-27
(D.N.J. 1963); Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710, 799-800, 810 (1965), rev'd, 395 F.2d 696
(7th Cir. 1968) (Commissioner Elman's dissent).
224. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
225. See id. at 690, 693, 697, 698-99, 701.
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discrimination as did the local pricing behavior of its national
rivals.
The Salt Lake City price rivalry among Utah Pie and its
three national rivals drove prices downward from 1958 to 1961.
Utah Pie, which in 1958 had sales amounting to 66.5% of the
market, continuously increased its sales during the period from
1957 to 1961, even though its share of the rapidly expanding
market declined to 45.3%.226 Utah Pie's profits, after an initial
loss of $6,461 during its first year of marketing frozen pies, rose
from $7,090 in 1958 to $9,216 in 1961. Its net worth also increased
from $31,651.98 in 1957 to $68,802.13 in 1961. During this same
period, the total number of frozen pies sold in the Salt Lake
City market increased over four and one-half times.227
Although the Supreme Court held that the jury properly
could have found a potential injury to local competition in the
pricing behavior of Utah Pie's national rivals, the Court was un-
clear as to the exact nature of the competitive injury: it re-
ferred to a "reasonably possible" injury, both to Utah Pie "as a
competitive force" and to competition generally.228 The precise
ways in which these injuries might occur were not explained
by the Court. An examination of the effects of the price rivalry
upon market structure alone would lead to the superficial con-
clusion that the market had become more, rather than less,
competitive. 229 Utah Pie, which previously had appeared to
dominate the local market with a 66.5% share, remained a sig-
nificant competitor with its 45.3% share, but no longer domi-
nated the market. Its viability appeared not to have been
lessened, since its sales, profits, and net worth had been stead-
ily increasing.230 Moreover, since Utah Pie had met, or under-
cut,23 1 the price reductions of its rivals, analysis of the
competitive-injury question could not easily have begun with
diversion. Utah Pie's responsive price reductions had largely
prevented sales from being diverted away from it; indeed, Utah
Pie's sales volume continuously increased 232 over the years in
question. The Supreme Court, therefore, might have focused
on lost profits as the point at which the inquiry into competitive
226. Id. at 689.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 700, 702.
229. In dissent, Justice Stewart adopted just such an analysis, concluding
that the market was more, not less, competitive. Id. at 705.
230. See text accompanying notes 226-227 supra.
231. See, e.g., 386 U.S. at 698-99 (Utah Pie responded to a price reduction by
Carnation by undercutting it).
232. See text accompanying note 226 supra.
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injury should begin. Yet, in dealing with the price reductions
of a rival firm, Continental, the Court made the curious asser-
tion that "[t]he jury was entitled to consider the potential im-
pact of Continental's price reduction absent any responsive
price cut by Utah Pie. '23 3 This is apparently a suggestion that
the actual impact on Utah Pie in terms of lost profits be ignored
in order to ascertain the extent of a hypothetical injury that
might have occurred under different circumstances. 234 Or per-
haps the Court really meant to apply a diversion approach to
injury and, in accordance with this approach, to recast the
event in diversion terms, even if the sales diversion had to be
hypothetical. But such an approach would almost make diver-
sion the end, rather than the beginning, of analysis. That ap-
proach, it would have been thought, had long been
discredited.235
An important factor in the Court's view of the case, how-
ever, appears to have been the "below cost" aspect 2 36 of much
of the defendants' pricing. The Court also found significant the
large size of the defendants' price reductions and the "drasti-
cally declining price structure" 23 7 caused by these reductions.
Apparently, the drastically declining price structure was pro-
jected 23 8 by the Court as potentially leading to further declines,
which Utah Pie would be unable to meet and which would
therefore drive Utah Pie from the market or injure it as an in-
dependent and viable competitor. Yet, if the Court indeed ana-
lyzed the case by projecting present trends, it was remarkably
silent about how its use of this projection analysis enabled it to
foresee the eventual transformation of the market into a state
of oligopolistic interdependence.239
233. 386 U.S. at 699. The Commission referred to this curious language with
approval in National Dairy, 71 F.T.C. at 1425.
234. It is unclear why the Court resorted to a measure of such a hypotheti-
cal injury as a justification for the jury verdict, when a lost-profits measure
would seem to have been more appropriate. Perhaps "the impact on Utah Pie
as a competitor was negligible," a possibility that the Court asserted was not
incompatible with injury to competition generally. 386 U.S. at 700. But injury to
Utah Pie would seem to be required for its antitrust standing. And since com-
putation of injury in the intensely price-competitive Salt Lake City market
would be difficult, the Court may have employed the measure of a hypothetical
injury as a means of overcoming this difficulty.
235. See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra.
236. See 386 U.S. at 697, 698-99, 701.
237. 386 U.S. at 703 & n.15.
238. See id. at 703 ("statutory test is one that necessarily looks forward on
the basis of proven conduct in the past").
239. A proper use of a projection analysis would include an assessment of
how the market structure might be altered as a result of the behavior under
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The Utah Pie case bears certain resemblances to Maryland
Baking Co. 2 40 and to the Commission's approaches in
Anheuser-Busch2 41 and Borden.24 In those cases price cuts
that worked substantial and rapid shifts in market shares were
condemned; the success of the price cuts in diverting substan-
tial shares of local markets to a price cutter was apparently
seen as indicative of the adversely affected rivals' lack of power
to prevent that diversion. Indeed, the Commission so described
its approach to the Maryland Baking decision. 243 Once the ri-
vals' lack of power to maintain their market shares becomes
apparent to the Commission, it is liable to project the present
pricing into the future and to assess the probable impact of
that pricing upon the affected rivals and the market struc-
ture.244 Whether an approach of this kind is correctly em-
ployed depends, as explained above,245 on whether the present
pricing behavior under challenge appears likely to be continued
for a long term, so that projections are likely to be accurate pre-
dictions of future market developments in the absence of offi-
cial intervention. Regardless of the propriety of its application,
however, the projection approach seems the best explanation
of the Commission's approach in the three mentioned cases as
well as the Supreme Court's approach in Utah Pie.246
The Supreme Court's Utah Pie opinion, by itself, appears
review. In the Utah Pie context, this use would require the Court to come to
terms with the fact that Utah Pie had expanded its sales and was still earning a
profit despite a "drastically declining price structure" in the local marketplace.
Id. at 703. This fact would suggest that the earlier market situation was a mo-
nopolistic one in which supracompetitive prices were being charged. These fac-
tors support Justice Stewart's conclusion that the market had become more
competitive. Id. at 705 (Stewart, J., dissenting). A careful employment of a
projection analysis by the Court would have attempted to demonstrate how
this apparent transformation of the market towards greater competitiveness
would nonetheless have ultimately produced a further transformation to a mar-
ket structure even less competitive than the original monopolistic one. See
also Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting, supra note 3, .at 1086.
240. Maryland Baking Co., 52 F.T.C. 1679 (1956), modified and aff'd, 243 F.2d
716 (4th Cir. 1957), order modified, 53 F.T.C. 1106 (1957). See text accompanying
notes 89-94 supra.
241. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), rev'd, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir.
1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), order vacated, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961). See
text accompanying notes 95-116 supra.
242. Borden Co., 64 F.T.C. 534 (1964), rev'd, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964). See
text accompanying notes 117-130 supra.
243. See 52 F.T.C. at 1689.
244. See text accompanying notes 100-102, 123-130, 199-209, 214 supra and
notes 352, 354-356 infra.
245. See text accompanying notes 114-116, 124-130, 161, 208-209 supra.
246. See text accompanying notes 238-239 supra. See also text accompany-
ing notes 100-102, 123-130, 183, 199-209, 214 supra and notes 352, 354-356 infra.
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to have two dimensions of importance. First, it seems to sup-
port the approach to the Robinson-Patman Act that draws in-
ferences of predatory intent from below-cost pricing. 247 But its
more important dimension appears to consist of its explication
of nonpredatory grounds for establishing competitive injury. In
context, the factors mentioned by the Court suggest that sub-
stantial price reductions that are designed to expand sales
volumes quickly and that actually do produce significant
changes in market shares-even when they lessen the domi-
nance of a locally dominant firm-may be considered to
"erode" competition.248 This is especially true when some of
the price reductions fall to a below-cost level and when the
market effects-the falling price levels and market-share
changes-appear likely to continue for a substantial period into
the future.249
VIIL THE AFTERMATH OF UTAH PIE
Utah Pie has been the analytic foundation of many of the
subsequent primary-line cases. The decision was a primary au-
thority for the Commission's decision in National Dairy Prod-
ucts Corp.250 It was also principally relied on by the Tenth
Circuit in Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread
Co.251 In the latter case, the defendant constructed a high-effi-
ciency, large-volume bakery plant, which could not be operated
profitably until the company increased its sales volume by 50%.
The bakery then discriminatorily slashed its prices in an effort
to obtain the volume necessary to operate its new plant at an
efficient level.252 Quoting Utah Pie's reference to "discrimina-
tory prices [that] consistently undercut other competitors, '25 3
the court suggested that the defendant bakery's price cutting
and construction of a large capacity plant demonstrated "some-
247. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696 n.12, 702 n.14
(1967). See 'TC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 552 (1960); Continental
Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97, 104 (10th Cir.) cert. denied,
414 U.S. 975 (1973); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605, 618-19 (7th
Cir. 1969). See also Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481, 486 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957); Comment, Unlawful Primary-Line Price Discrimi-
nations: Predatory Intent and Competitive Injury, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 137, 145
(1968).
248. See 386 U.S. at 703.
249. See text accompanying notes 127-130, 182, 207 supra and note 280 infra.
250. 71 F.T.C. 1333, 1425-28 (1967), modified and enforced, 412 F.2d 605 (7th
Cir. 1969); see text accompanying notes 264-289 infra.
251. 476 F.2d 97, 104 (10th Cir. 1973).
252. Id. at 101, 104.
253. Id. at 104.
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thing more than 'fierce competitive instincts' ": they consti-
tuted a sufficient basis from which a jury could draw inferences
of predatory intent.254
There appear to be many flaws in the Tenth Circuit's Old
Homestead decision.255 Defendant's actions in constructing a
plant with large economies of scale and then cutting prices to
secure requisite sales volume for the plant do not seem to form
the basis for inferences of predatory intent, unless predatory
intent is redefined to include the intention to succeed in the
competitive race by becoming more efficient than one's ri-
vals.256 But Old Homestead is perhaps more significant for
what the Tenth Circuit did not do. The court made no attempt
to employ Utah Pie's criteria governing nonpredatory discrimi-
nation to justify a finding of competitive injury.257 This omis-
sion illustrates what is perhaps the most significant aspect of
Utah Pie: its attempt to formulate standards governing the
evaluation of competitive injury caused by nonpredatory dis-
crimination has been ignored by most courts. 25 8
Moreover, in the Utah Pie litigation itself, the Supreme
Court's opinion seems to have only marginally affected the
eventual result in the case. On remand, the Tenth Circuit ex-
tensively analyzed the impact on the plaintiff of the discrimina-
tory pricing employed by each of the defendants. Although the
court was constrained by the Supreme Court's holding that the
jury finding of competitive injury was supported by substantial
evidence,259 the court analyzed in detail the actual operations
of the market and its participants and set aside the damages
awarded by the jury.260
Other cases, in distinguishing the Supreme Court's Utah
254. Id.
255. The court in that case failed to consider the extent to which the de-
fendant's behavior in building the large plant furthered the efficiency goals of
the antitrust laws and also failed to consider the extent to which those efficien-
cies might have been passed on to the public. See Gifford, Promotional Price-
Cutting, supra note 3, at 1086-97.
256. The propriety of the sales agreement between Continental and Five
States Supply Company is not meant to be commented on. See 476 F.2d at 102.
257. Indeed, aside from mention of a procedural issue, Old Homestead cites
Utah Pie only in connection with the issue of predatory intent. See id. at 101,
104.
258. An exception is National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605, 615-18
(7th Cir. 1969), in which Utah Pie is employed to help evaluate the potential
and actual results of discriminatory price cutting apart from the issue of preda-
tory intent.
259. See Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 396 F.2d 161, 164 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 860 (1968).
260. Id. at 183-84, 191-95.
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Pie opinion, have made it a two-edged sword.261 Courts that
are disinclined to find primary-line injury can support their po-
sition by noting the absence of one or more of the factors listed
by the Supreme Court in that opinion. In Borden II, for exam-
ple, the Fifth Circuit felt that the absence of a "drastically de-
clining price structure" made other references of the Supreme
Court in Utah Pie inapposite.262 This approach facilitated the
court's affirmation of the continuing relevance of case law prior
to Utah Pie that had suggested that competitive injury is un-
likely where the discriminator's rivals are expanding and earn-
ing profits.26
3
Utah Pie was later followed in the Commission's National
Dairy Corp. decision.264 In that case, a processor of jams and
jellies, which previously had been unable to sell to supermar-
ket chains in the Washington-Baltimore area, offered unlimited
quantities of its products at half price for a limited "promotion"
period. The offer was extremely successful: vast quantities
were ordered and the volume sales of the processor's major re-
gional rivals in the Washington-Baltimore area fell significantly.
Finding the offer "below cost,"265 the Commission condemned
the local price reductions and supported its condemnation with
quotations from the Supreme Court's denunciation of "radical
price cuts" in Utah Pie.2 66
The Commission also questioned the ability of regional ri-
vals to respond to the respondent's price cuts. Finding that the
prices were "below [the] cost of manufacture," the Commis-
sion concluded that the respondent knew those prices could
not be met by its rivals.2 67 The focus on this issue resembles
that of Maryland Baking Co., in which the rival's lack of power
to withstand the respondent's aggressions meant that the rival,
261. See generally Hebrews 4:12; Psalms 149:6; Revelation 1:16.
262. Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 179 n.12 (5th Cir. 1967) (quoting Utah
Pie v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 703 (1967)). It is true, however, that
the Borden II court appeared to view the Utah Pie case as explainable largely
on the grounds of predatory intent. See id. at 177, 179 n.12.
263. Id. at 179 & n.12, 180. See Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v.
F.T.C., 191 F.2d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952) and
Purex Corp., 51 F.T.C. 100, 140-43 (1954), both of which were cited by the court;
General Foods Corp., 50 F.T.C. 885, 891 (1954); text accompanying notes 78-83
supra. See also Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1580, 1602 (1956).
264. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 71 F.T.C. 1333 (1967), af'd, 412 F.2d 605
(7th Cir. 1969).
265. 71 F.T.C. at 1425. The respondent's prices were later characterized as
"below its cost of manufacture." Id. at 1426. See also id. at 1415.
266. Id. at 1426. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702
n.14 (1967).
267. 71 F.T.C. at 1426, 1427. See also id. at 1415.
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despite its originally large market share, had no "monopolistic
hold" on the market,268 and thus the shrinkage of its market
share as a result of the respondent's discriminations did not
make the market more competitive. Rather, the rival's loss of
its market share may have impressed upon the Commission
the relative power of the discriminator. Similarly, in National
Dairy Corp., the rivals' lack of power to withstand the respon-
dent's aggressive price cuts showed the relative power of the
respondent, a power that the Commission inferred was derived
from the respondent's ability to subsidize its local below-cost
prices with sales from its other operations. 2 69 Thus, the Com-
mission synthesized the factors of rapid changes in market
shares, the respondent's, below-cost pricing and inferences of
the subsidy effect on respondent's prices from its sales else-
where, in its assertion that the "respondent could not wait to
develop a larger share of the market by a legitimate means but
used the power of its treasury to appropriate a share of its com-
petitors' business by a below cost offer which it knew these
competitors could not meet. '27 0
The Commission further bolstered its negative assessment
of the respondent's pricing practices by utilizing a "reasonable
foreseeability" analysis: the respondent could reasonably fore-
see that its rivals could not match its below-cost offer.27 1 The
Commission could therefore attribute to the respondent the ob-
jective intent to behave in such a way as to make competition
impossible. The Commission then found it probable that re-
spondent would repeat this kind of behavior. "if not satisfied
with its market share," the respondent "could and would en-
gage in offers that not only substantially divert trade but are so
designed that other sellers cannot compete. '27 2 Further analy-
268. Maryland Baking Co., 52 F.T.C. 1679, 1689 (1956), modified and affid, 243
F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957). See text accompanying note 92 supra.
269. See 71 F.T.C. at 1426.
270. Id.
271. See id. at 1419-21, 1426-27. See also Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting,
supra note 3, at 1107 n.247.
272. 71 F.T.C. at 1427. The Commission considered the "projection ap-
proach" to have been approved by the Supreme Court's Utah Pie decision. It
first considered the Utah Pie Court's approach to the two-week price cut of
Continental to be indicative of a proper method of evaluating short-term dis-
criminations. See id. at 1425. The Commission then described the nature of
that approach by observing that the Court "held that the jury could rationally
have concluded that Continental would have again repeated its offer, that
Safeway would have continued to buy from Continental and that other buyers
would have followed suit," id., and that "the test of competitive injury," accord-
ing to Utah Pie, was "'one that necessarily looks forward on the basis of
proven conduct in the past."' Id. at 1428.
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sis was held to be unnecessary.
In National Dairy, most of the behavioral elements of the
classic predator as described in the 1914 Committee report
were before the Commission.2 7 3 National Dairy was a multi-
market seller offering its products in a local market at a below-
cost price so low that its rivals were unable to compete with it.
The Commission attempted to reinforce its evaluation of Na-
tional Dairy's behavior by casting the firm in the role of the
classic predator and, accordingly, attributing to it a discrimina-
tory motivation. To be properly equated with the classic
predator, however, National Dairy would have to be shown to
have intended to eliminate its rivals from the markets in ques-
tion. Such intent would demonstrate the likely anticompetitive
consequences of its discriminatorily low prices.2 7 4 The Com-
mission did not show that National Dairy intended to drive its
rivals permanently from the market, but it did show what it be-
lieved to be nearly as sufficient: that the firm knew or should
have known that its rivals could not meet its own below-cost
prices. 275 If National Dairy could be charged with such actual
or constructive knowledge, then regardless of its subjective in-
tent, it could be attributed an "objective" intent, which could
substitute for the predatory intent that the courts had long ac-
cepted as the basis for an inference of anticompetitive tenden-
cies. 27 6
Two serious difficulties and one major flaw permeate the
Commission's objective-intent approach. The first difficulty
arises from the fact that the predator has an anticompetitive
aim: it wants to control the local market. National Dairy does
not appear to have desired any control of the marketplace; it
claimed that it merely wanted to enter the supermarket seg-
273. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
274. Predatory intent, by definition, is intent to bring about consequences
that are anticompetitive. See Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting, supra note 3,
at 1048. A showing of such intent has long been held a sufficient basis for infer-
ring that the intended consequences are likely to occur. See Utah Pie Co. v.
Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v.
FTC, 371 F.2d 277, 281-82 (7th Cir. 1966).
275. 71 F.T.C. at 1426-27. See also id. at 1420.
276. From the evidence of the respondent's behavior in the market, the
Commission concluded.
[R]espondent, if not satisfied with its market share, could and would
engage in offers that not only substantially divert trade but are so
designed that other sellers cannot compete. As so motivated, the
probability of an adverse effect from respondent's price cuts is estab-




ment of the local market.277 The Commission found an intent
only to appropriate a market share with undue speed.27 8 By
seeking to enter a market segment from which it had previ-
ously been excluded, or by seeking to appropriate quickly a
share of the market, National Dairy might be said to have in-
tended to make the market more competitive by adding itself
as an additional competitive force. The second difficulty arises
from the fact that the predator's goal is a long-term goal. Na-
tional Dairy, even in the Commission's view, did not intend to
bring about a major, long-term restructuring of the local mar-
ket, nor did it intend to restructure the market in an anticom-
petitive direction;279 at most, it sought to establish itself quickly
in the local market.
The Commission attempted to meet these difficulties, how-
ever, with its objective-intent reasonable foreseeability analy-
sis. 280 An objective assessment of National Dairy's price cut
indicated that it could not be met by the processor's rivals.
And, since the product could be stored and offered in unlimited
quantities, the temporal effects of the discrimination extended
for a time beyond the actual offer period.281 Since these effects
were readily inferable from its own actions and from
knowledge of the market, which, as an experienced seller, it
must have had, National Dairy was chargeable with construc-
tive knowledge of these foreseeable consequences of its behav-
ior.282 In short, National Dairy was held to have intended the
natural and probable consequences of its actions. If those con-
sequences produced an anticompetitive effect by excluding the
firm's rivals from the local market, the firm was chargeable
with the intent to bring about those consequences. National
Dairy's objective intent could now be substituted for predatory
intent as a basis for inferring anticompetitive consequences
from its behavior.283
The flaw in this approach is clear. To find an objective in-
tent that will be a surrogate for predatory intent, the Commis-
sion must first analyze the market consequences of the
respondent's behavior and find them anticompetitive or poten-
277. Id. at 1419.
278. See id. at 1426.
279. National Dairy's goal of obtaining a larger share of the Washington-Bal-
timore market would not require the demise of any firms nor any additions to
its own plant. See also J. DUE, supra note 169, at 182.
280. See text accompanying notes 275-276 supra.
281. See 71 F.T.C. at 1416-17, 1421-22, 1426.
282. See id. at 1420-21, 1427.
283. See id. at 1419-20, 1427.
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tially anticompetitive; it must then conclude that, because the
respondent was aware of the likely market consequences, it in-
tended their anticompetitive aspects. Once the Commission
has conducted such a market analysis, however, intent be-
comes irrelevant. A finding of predatory intent is relevant only
as a means of short-cutting market analysis, or as corroboration
of the conclusions of an independent analysis.284 Here the ob-
jective intent neither short-cuts market analysis nor cor-
roborates it.
The Commission's position thus is reduced to a condemna-
tion of National Dairy for using below-cost prices to substan-
tially undercut the prevailing price in a local market-knowing
that rivals would not respond with matching price cuts-in or-
der to acquire a significant market share. The share that Na-
tional Dairy acquired or sought to acquire was not said to be
too large; it was merely said to be acquired too rapidly. The
Commission thus appears to have employed a temporal sense
of proportion to evaluate market-entry behavior.285
The real emphasis in National Dairy, however, was on
pricing that is so low that it disables rivals from making respon-
sive price cuts. The ability and willingness to so act was seen
as releasing the discriminator from competitive restraint and
enabling it to expand its market share at will. The expansion
thus coincided with, and was facilitated by, a suppression of
competition.286 This is perhaps one reason why the Commis-
sion saw no need to articulate guidelines concerning either the
size of the market share objective or the time frame in which
expansion might properly proceed. These factors are within
the discriminator's discretion so long as it suppresses the abil-
ity of its rivals to respond to its moves within the market.
Yet, a market entrant frequently will be forced initially to
price below its own costs, because volume in the new market
will not be large enough at first to enable the entry price to
cover all properly allocated unit cost components, 28 7 and be-
cause an entrant's undercutting will not divert sales to it or fa-
284. See, e.g., Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277, 282 (7th Cir.
1966).
285. See Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting, supra note 3, at 1075-76, 1081-82
& n.142, 1105-07.
286. The Commission repeatedly emphasized the inability of respondent's
rivals to respond effectively to its promotion. See 71 F.T.C. at 1418, 1426, 1428.
See also National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605, 618 (7th Cir. 1969).
287. See, e.g., Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in Applied Economic The-




cilitate the success of its entry attempt if the existing market
participants respond by meeting its price.2 88 The entrant must,
therefore, undercut the prevailing local market price at a level
both below its own costs and at a point that it believes will not
be matched by existing market participants. The Commission
appears to believe that an entrant may achieve success by less
radical undercutting than that undertaken by National Dairy,
so that the entrant's prices will be high enough to be poten-
tially matched by its rivals, but low enough so that, in practice,
the existing market participants will allow continued undercut-
ting of their own prevailing prices during the entry period. Ri-
vals might be willing to tolerate this undercutting on the basis
that, by allowing their market shares to erode somewhat in-
stead of matching the entrant's prices, their profit positions will
be optimized. 289 They would still retain the ability to respond
in kind if necessary. Under such a view, the entrant would be
growing in the local market while remaining continuously sub-
ject to competitive restraint.
Dean Milk Co.2 90 also involved a market-entry situation.
The Commission, in addition to attempting to formulate stan-
dards for the evaluation of primary-line injury,29 1 did advert
specifically to the peculiar problems of entry. The Commission
conceded that the low sales volume of an entrant in the early
stages of entry may force it to temporarily sell at a level below
cost. The Commission asserted, however, that a multi-market
seller, while maintaining higher prices elsewhere, might not
undercut prevailing prices at a below-cost level, or at a level
yielding only negligible profits, for "an extended period."292
National Dairy also dealt with other kinds of promotions.
In its opinion, the Commission vindicated one promotion in
which all of National Dairy's sales were above its costs and in
which the sales losses of rivals were attributed to factors other
than the firm's discrimination.293 The Commission also ap-
proved National Dairy's behavior in a third promotion in which
the firm incurred losses in the first year, but not in the second
288. Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting, supra note 3, at 1074 n.116.
289. The greater the sales base of an existing seller, the longer it will be in-
clined to tolerate an entrant's inroads on that base before it will be impelled to
reduce its own prices to a level equal to, or approximating, the entrant's price
level.
290. Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710 (1965), affid in part and rev'd in part, 395
F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968).
291. See text accompanying note 178 supra.
292. 68 F.T.C. at 775 n.147.
293. See 71 F.T.C. at 1433-34.
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and third years, unless advertising expenses were computed
into the calculation of its earnings.294
When viewed together, National Dairy and Dean appear to
constitute a Commission statement that even in an apparently
procompetitive entry situation, an entrant must not maintain
below-cost prices for an "extended period," or at a level that ri-
vals are unable to meet, to achieve quickly even a non-monopo-
listic share of the market.295 In both cases, the Commission
seems to be attempting to objectify the standards for territorial
discrimination. Its apparent concession that certain expenses,
such as advertising, may perhaps be treated differently when
determining whether an entrant is operating at a below-cost
level,2 6 and its related concession that entrants can be prop-
erly expected to price temporarily both below their own costs
and below their market rivals' prices, 2 97 reflect an attempt to
accommodate its entry standards to the realities of actual com-
petitive behavior. Yet its objective approach, even as modified,
ultimately fails. It leaves too wide a scope for unguided, and
hence unpredictable, evaluation by the Commission.298
294. Id. at 1440-46. The Commission relied on subsequent experience which
showed that Durkee-Mower, Inc., a principal rival of the respondent, which had
lost substantial business during the year of the respondent's promotion, there-
after reversed its sales decline and attained in the affected area a sales volume
that exceeded its pre-promotion level. The losses of two other rivals were ex-
plained as projections of their earlier lackluster market performances. The
Commission relied on these factors to conclude that the promotion was not po-
tentially anticompetitive. Id. at 1436-40. The Commission also rejected an alle-
gation of predatory intent based upon sustained below-cost pricing-
Respondent ... traditionally regards advertising on a new product for
the first three to five years as part of its capital investment. In any
event, it does not appear to be unusual for a company introducing a
new product to sustain a net loss. We are not convinced that the net
losses sustained by respondent, particularly since it would have to em-
ploy extensive advertising in the [relevant product] market, dominated
by a competitor, in order to gain consumer acceptance, is sufficient to
warrant a finding of predatory intent.
Id. at 1441.
295. Id. at 1426. See text accompanying note 278 supra.
296. 71 F.T.C. at 1441. See note 294 supra.
297. Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710, 775 n.147 (1965). See text accompanying
note 292 supra. See also National Dairy Prods. Corp., 71 F.T.C. 1333, 1441 (1967),
affd, 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969).
298. Thus, the Commission has not adequately reconciled or explained its
differing reactions to recurrent factors appearing in the cases. The presence of
locally dominant sellers was viewed as a factor tending to justify discrimina-
tory undercutting by the respondent in two of the promotions in National
Dairy. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 71 F.T.C. 1333, 1433, 1441 (1967), affd, 412
F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969). The presence of locally dominant sellers, however, was
held not to justify discriminatory undercutting in Maryland Baking. Maryland
Baking Co., 52 F.T.C. 1679, 1689 (1956), modified and afd, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.
1957). See also Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 703 n.14
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On review of National Dairy, the Seventh Circuit adopted
the reasonable foreseeability analysis of the Commission.
299
Whereas the Commission had employed a reasonable foresee-
ability analysis in an attempt to establish an objective sense of
predatory intent, the Seventh Circuit employed that analysis
directly in its evaluation of the respondent's behavior, apart
fom the predatory-intent question.30 0 According to that court,
the impact of the respondent's offer on its rivals could be fore-
seen. Therefore, the respondent was responsible for those con-
sequences. 30 1 The court concluded that the preclusion of the
rivals from the Washington and Baltimore chain store markets
for several months meant that competition was lessened, ap-
parently even if the rivals could later return as vigorous com-
petitors.3 02
At the court of appeals level, the National Dairy decision
may be an aberration. It has not been followed. Later cases in
other circuits have manifested even less sympathy to claims of
primary-line competitive injury than did the courts in the late
1950s and early 1960s.30 3 Indeed, a line of recent cases has
demonstrated increasing suspicion toward any claims of poten-
tial primary-line injury that are not accompanied by proof of
sales below marginal cost.3°4
(1967). Entry was found to justify below-cost undercutting in one National
Dairy promotion but not in another promotion by the same firm. See National
Dairy Prods. Corp., 71 F.T.C. 1333, 1427, 1441 (1967). Entry also did not, in the
Commission's view, justify Dean Milk's prolonged below-cost undercutting.
See Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710, 774 (1965), affid in part and rev'd in part, 395
F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968). The Commission's apparent willingness to project mar-
ket effects as of the date of the discriminatory pricing without taking into ac-
count subsequent market events, and the reviewing court's reluctance to so
project market effects, largely explain the different results reached by the Com-
mission and the court in Anheuser-Busch. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C.
277, 299-301 (1957), rev'd, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 536 (1960),
order vacated, 289 F.2d 835, 843 (7th Cir. 1961). Subsequent experience, how-
ever, was employed by the Commission to reject inferences of adverse market
effects in one National Dairy promotion. See National Dairy Prods. Corp., 71
F.T.C. 1333, 1436-37 (1967). In one part of National Dairy, the Commission used
projections of preexisting business difficulties of firms to show an absence of
causal connection between their plight and the discriminatory pricing. The
Commission's failure to make such projections, however, was a principal
ground for the reviewing court's reversal of the Commission in Dean Milk Co.
See Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 703 (7th Cir. 1968); National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 71 F.T.C. 1333, 1438 (1967), aff'd, 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969).
299. See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605, 615 (7th Cir. 1969).
300. See id. at 615-16, 618.
301. This is implied in the court's reference to the consequences of the re-
spondent's behavior as "reasonably foreseeable." See id. at 615.
302. See id. at 618.
303. See note 191 supra.
304. See text accompanying notes 322-325 infra.
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At the Commission level, however, National Dairy seems
to be a critical case. After National Dairy was decided in 1967,
the Commission has not had occasion to decide an important
contested primary-line case.30 5 It has effectively ceased issuing
complaints alleging primary-line injury, perhaps because it has
finally recognized its long-term lack of success in nonpredatory
primary-line cases in the courts of appeals. Yet, it is ironic that
the Commission decided to abandon such cases after finally
having convinced a court of appeals of the validity of a theory
of nonpredatory primary-line injury.
Perhaps upon further reflection, however, the Commission
recognized the impropriety of pursuing an aggressive attack on
price discrimination with primary-line effects. Even if that is
so, it is one more instance in which the Commission has fought
hard to vindicate a position, has succeeded, and has then with-
drawn. This occurred previously both in the case of basing-
point pricing 30 6 and in connection with the use of a section
2(b) defense by suppliers offering selective price reductions to
dealers confronted with intense -competition at the resale
level.30 7 But the Commission has often revamped its theories
to match those of reviewing courts. 308 Perhaps this is to be ex-
pected from an enforcement agency that, despite its expertise,
may continuously face judicial review of its decisions. Now
that the Commission has revamped its liability theories about
primary-line price discrimination, it is unwilling to exploit the
victory30 9 that its litigation section has obtained for it.
More recently, an article on predatory pricing written by
Professors Areeda and Turner 310 has had a profound effect on
305. Subsequent primary-line decisions of the Commission under the
Robinson-Patman Act have been few in number and have not been contested.
See Balsa Ecuador Lumber Co., 77 F.T.C. 83 (1970); Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 77
F.T.C. 1 (1970). See, however, Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 808 (1978), which pro-
hibited price discriminaiton under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. See also Koppers Co., 79 F.T.C. 837 (1971).
306. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
307. See FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963); FTC, Commission Policy
with Respect to Anticompetitive Practices in the Marketing of Gasoline, [1967]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 10,373, at 18,241.
308. Thus, for example, the Commission first adopted the Moss diversion
test of competitive injury and later replaced it with a market approach drawn
from the Seventh Circuit's Minneapolis-Honeywell opinion. See text accompa-
nying notes 58-61, 71-81 supra. Several aspects of the Seventh Circuit's second
Anheuser-Busch opinion have also supplanted earlier Commission approaches
in the more recent Commission opinions.
309. See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969).
310. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3. See also 3 P. AREEDA & D. TutRNE, AN-
TrrR UST LAw 150-94 (1978).
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judicial attitudes toward primary-line price discrimination
claims. The thesis of the article is that pricing at or above mar-
ginal cost should never be considered predatory, because such
pricing will not exclude efficient sellers from the market-
place.31 ' Because marginal cost is difficult to calculate, Areeda
and Turner allowed the use of the more easily computed aver-
age variable cost as a surrogate for marginal cost in determin-
ing predation. 312 They would also modify their main thesis by
permitting pricing below marginal cost when marginal cost ex-
ceeds average cost, so long as these prices do not fall below av-
erage cost.313 Areeda and Turner, however, did not limit their
analysis to defining and examining predatory pricing. They
also argued that nonpredatory pricing, defined by them to be
pricing at or above marginal cost, should not be prohibited
under either the Sherman Act or the Robinson-Patman Act.3 14
The attempts by courts to articulate workable definitions for
nonpredatory discrimination that violates the latter Act were
summarily dismissed as misguided by Areeda and Turner.3 15
The Areeda and Turner approach has evoked significant
critical commentary and a number of lively scholarly ex-
changes. 3 16 One challenger has contended that the abolition of
intent and the legitimization of all prices above marginal cost,
or above average cost when marginal cost exceeds average cost,
opens the door to exclusionary behavior by a dominant firm
whose lower prices are only temporary.317 Another challenger
has contended that a dominant firm might intentionally con-
311. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 711. In addition, Areeda and Tur-
ner argued that requiring the price to be set at a higher price would be econom-
ically inefficient because it would waste potentially available production
capacity. Id. The authors also made an exception by permitting pricing below
marginal cost when marginal cost exceeds average total cost. Under such cir-
cumstances average total cost was to be the lower limit on prices. Thus, their
rule can be stated as follows: predatory prices are those prices below the lower
of average cost or marginal cost. See id. at 712-13. Marginal costs above aver-
age cost would occur in cases in which production approached full plant capac-
ity.
312. Id. at 716.
313. Id. at 712-13.
314. Id. at 727.
315. Id.
316. See Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARv.
L REv. 891 (1976); Areeda & Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE
L.J. 1337 (1978); Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act. A Comment,
89 HARv. L REv. 869 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89
HARv. L. REv. 901 (1976); Williamson, A Preliminary Response, 87 YALE L.J.
1353 (1978); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis,
87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
317. Williamson, Predatory Pricing, supra note 316, at 291-92.
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struct a plant with chronic excess capacity in order to be in a
position to deter entry through pricing that conforms to the
Areeda and Turner rules,318 that it is uncertain whether courts
would apply the Areeda and Turner criteria to condemn a mo-
nopolist who has refused to reduce recently expanded produc-
tion in the face of an entrant's challenge, 319 and that the rules
neglect long-term social welfare.320 These critics and others, in-
cluding the author,321 have suggested alternative criteria for
evaluating the lawfulness of various types of price-cutting be-
havior. The Areeda and Turner approach, nonetheless, has re-
ceived favorable attention from the courts.
A number of courts have adopted the Areeda and Turner
analysis as a method for evaluating pricing behavior under the
Sherman Act.322 Several courts have also applied that analysis
318. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act supra note 316, at 877.
319. Id. at 873-75.
320. Id. at 885.
321. This author has proposed an "end result" test for assessing the lawful-
ness of discrin-inatorily low pricing undertaken by a firm in connection with
market entry or in connection with the deployment of new investment. See
Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting, supra note 3, at 1098-99. See also R. Pos-
NE, supra note 170, at 188-96. Professor Posner has proposed as the principal
criterion of unlawful pricing, the failure of prices to cover "average balance-
sheet costs," but has required, in addition, that the pricing be intended to ex-
clude an equally efficient, or more efficient, competitor.
322. See Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 858 (9th
Cir. 1977); Hanson v. Shell ORl Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. IT Continental
Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410, 417 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Cf. Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co.
of Nev. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
879 (1977) ("Although we do not intend to adopt a solely cost-based test, there
are no other relevant factors indicating [anticompetitive conduct]." The court
does, however, make it clear that "evidence of marginal cost or average variable
cost is extremely beneficial in establishing a case of monopolization through
predatory pricing.").
The original article by Professors Areeda and Turner has provoked a dia-
logue over predatory pricing. Dr. Scherer has claimed that their cost-based test
will not promote an efficient allocation of economic resources. He proposes, as
an alternative, a more complex multivariable analysis, which includes an in-
quiry into the subjective intent of the alleged predator. See Scherer, Predatory
Pricing and the Sherman Ac supra note 316. See also note 3 supra; Areeda &
Turner, Scherer on Predator Pricing, supra note 316; Scherer, Some Last Words
on Predatory Pricing, supra note 316. Professor Williamson concurs with
Areeda and Turner in viewing Scherer's approach as relying on "long run pos-
sibilities [that] are intrinsically speculative and indeterminate." Williamson,
Predatory Pricing, supra note 316, at 288 n.16 (quoting Areeda & Turner, supra
note 3, at 897). Williamson modifies the approach of Areeda and Turner, how-
ever, by requiring "dominant firms" to refrain from expanding their output
when another firm enters the market. See id. at 334. See also Areeda & Turner,
Williamson on Predatory Pricing, supra note 316; Williamson, A Preliminary
Response, supra note 316. Despite the volume of comment on Areeda and Tur-
ner's test, no courts have adopted any of the alternative proposals. But cf. Pa-
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to the evaluation of primary-line injury under the Robinson-
Patman Act.323 Some of these courts have concluded that the
Robinson-Patman Act does not prohibit conduct that is not al-
ready condemned under the Sherman Act.3 24 And when those
courts employ the Areeda-and-Turner analysis of predatory
pricing, they tend to reach the conclusion that only predatory
pricing behavior can be condemned by the Robinson-Patman
Act, and that such behavior consists of pricing below marginal
cost, or its average-variable-cost surrogate. 325
The Supreme Court's Utah Pie opinion has been occasion-
ally read as upholding the use of below-average-total-cost pric-
ing as a basis for inferring predatory intent and, hence, for
inferring competitive injury. Such an inference would, of
course, conflict with the recommendations of Areeda and Tur-
ner, who object to any prohibition of marginal-cost pricing-
even when not profit-maximizing-as promoting inefficiency.3 26
For the most part, however, the Supreme Court's opinion tends
to be perceived as wrongly decided. It has been indirectly, if
not directly, rejected by those courts that have adopted margi-
nal cost as the line dividing predatory from nonpredatory be-
havior.3 2 7 This new approach rejects not only Utah Pie, but
also other Supreme Court and lower court opinions that have
construed the Robinson-Patman Act as prohibiting some non-
predatory price discrimination on the basis of its potential pri-
mary-line effects.328
cific Eng'r & Prod. Co. of Nev. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d at 797 & n.8
(mentioning Scherer's views without commenting on their validity; simultane-
ously viewing Areeda and Turner's proposals favorably).
323. Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 798 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); International Air Indus., Inc. v. American
Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). See
Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1977).
324. Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir.
1977); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 794 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
325. See note 324 supra. But cf., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410, 417-18 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (disallowing
the substitution of average variable cost for marginal cost in evaluating pricing
behavior under the antitrust laws).
326. Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at 726-27. There is a limited class of
cases where marginal costs are in excess of average costs. See note 308 supra.
327. See Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 (9th
Cir. 1977); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 798 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. UT
Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410, 422 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
328. Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855 (9th Cir.
1977); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 798 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). But see International Air Indus., Inc. v.
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IX. PRIMARY-LINE STANDARDS TODAY
Is it possible, on the basis of the preceding examination of
the cases, to isolate the factors that produce nonpredatory, pri-
mary-line harm cognizable under the Robinson-Patman Act?
Any attempt to synthesize the case law is hazardous, given
forty-three years of confusing and often conflicting decisions by
the courts and the Commission. Yet forty-three years of his-
tory provide some indication of the core constituents of pri-
mary-line harm.
A. THE ELEMENTS OF A PARADIGM CASE OF INJURY TO
PARRICULAR FIRMS
In order to establish competitive injury, the discriminato-
rily low prices must be at a level which initially undercut the
prices of at least some rivals in a local market.329 Second, the
discriminatorily low prices must force the price level of rivals
down to the point where they are likely to be substantially
weakened as viable competitors if the lowered price levels re-
main in effect for long.330 Third, the circumstances must indi-
cate that the lowered price level will continue for a substantial
period with a concomitant weakening of rivals, or, if it lasts for
a short period only, the circumstances must indicate that repe-
titions of the discriminatory pricing in the same market are
likely to have a weakening effect on rivals because of the cumu-
lative impact of these periods of low pricing.3 31 The operation
of these weakening effects are examined below.
B. VARIATIONS ON THE PARADIGM CASE
The discriminatorily low prices may not force down the
prices of all rivals to their own level. To the extent that rivals
refuse to meet the discriminator's low prices, the rivals may
lose business. The loss of business by a rival firm will normally
involve profit loss by that firm and possibly increased per-unit
costs due to the forced shrinkage in the scale of its opera-
American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 n.30 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 943 (1976).
329. Unless the discriminatory prices undercut those of at least some rivals,
they will have no adverse impact upon any rival firms and, a fortiori, no adverse
impact upon the market structure.
330. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710, 750 (1965), affd in part rev'd in
part, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968).




tions.332 Continuance of the lowered prices is usually neces-
sary to weaken rival firms. Under normal circumstances any
firm should be able to withstand a short period of competition
from rivals' selling at levels that are below the firm's unit costs
or at levels that generate abnormally low profits. Since the
prospect of an alteration in the conditions of competition is re-
quired for a violation,333 the low pricing must formally con-
tinue for a substantial period, appear likely to continue for a
substantial period, or continue for a short period but appear
likely to be repeated in the same market with sufficient fre-
quency to produce a cumulative effect 334 equal in its weakening
impact upon the discriminator's rivals to a prolonged period of
low pricing.335
C. THE WEAKENING EFFECT ON RwVAL FIRMS
The weakening impact on rival firms occurs when, for sus-
tained periods, those firms are forced to sell at prices below
their own costs, either because their prices have been forced
downward or because their costs, due to a decline in sales vol-
ume, have been forced upward. Rivals who are single-market
332. Sales loss will increase unit costs if the affected firm has been operat-
ing on a falling average cost curve, as it might, for example, when fixed costs
constitute the major component of its total costs. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951); Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co.,
269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Forster Mfg. Co.,
62 F.T.C. 852, 902-04 (1963), vacated and remanded, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964).
See also note 134 supra.
333. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
334. See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605, at 616.
335. In addition to the prospect of an actual weakening of rivals, potentially
anticompetitive consequences will result when the discriminator uses his
power to force prices down to an unprofitable level as a threat or as a discipli-
nary device to deter local rivals from price undercutting. This is, of course,
predatory behavior in the traditional sense of that term, but is included in this
discussion of non-predatorily motivated pricing to illustrate anticompetitive
market effects apart from those which result from the demise of rivals. In such
an instance, the discriminatory pricing does not primarily threaten the financial
strength of rivals; competition is not lessened by crippling or eliminating rivals
from the marketplace. Instead, the discriminatory pricing serves to retain the
existing number of rivals and to establish an interdependency that protects
both the discriminator and its rivals from the rigors of price competition. Ac-
cordingly, discriminatory behavior aimed at threatening or punishing rivals
may likely engender its own peculiar anticompetitive results. When the
threatened rivals fall into line, after only a short period of discriminatorily low
prices, the anticompetitve effects may be felt by consumers more quickly than
those resulting from the gradual weakening and elimination of competitors.
Such a result could occur, for example, when the rivals, mistakenly appre-
hending great financial strength in the discriminator, sense a threat of pro-
longed low pricing that the discriminator is in fact unable or unwilling to carry
out.
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operators must, in the long run, cover their full costs from oper-
ations in the local market in which they sell and thus will be
particularly vulnerable to competition at levels below their own
average costs.336 Rivals also operating in other markets unaf-
fected by the discriminatory prices, however, may be able to
sustain indefinitely local operations at prices below their aver-
age costs, but not below their marginal costs. 3 37
This weakening effect that low prices may have on rival
firms is, from one perspective, a function of the degree of en-
croachment upon costs and the expected time frame during
which such encroachment occurs or is likely to occur. If a
firm's costs are only slightly undercut, that firm may be able to
weather a period of undercutting much longer than if costs are
drastically undercut. The weakening prospect seems to be
measured by the degree to which total contributions from the
revenues of the affected firms toward their fixed costs are re-
duced or likely to be reduced. The greater the undercutting of
unit costs, the larger is the deficit in fixed-cost contributions
and the shorter is the time period in which an actual weaken-
ing effect can be expected.3 38
When marginal costs are undercut, the weakening effect is
likely to be drastic. Fixed-cost contributions are not engen-
dered by the firm's operations. And the more the firm pro-
duces, the greater are the losses it incurs. Clearly, a firm is in a
significantly different position when its marginal costs are un-
dercut than when its total unit costs are undercut. When it is
forced to meet prices above marginal costs, but below total unit
costs, every sale contributes to its fixed-cost requirements and
thereby lessens the deficit that has been forced upon it.339 By
contrast, when it is forced to operate, if at all, at a price level
below its marginal costs, every additional sale increases its
losses. In such a case, actual weakening would occur very
quickly.
Low prices forced upon local firms may exert a weakening
impact upon those firms even though the low prices produce
revenues equal to or in excess of their costs. If low profits re-
sult in returns that are decreased sufficiently to interfere with a
336. See Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting, supra note 3, at 1052.
337. Indeed, in some cases locally confined marginal-cost pricing may con-
tribute to the overall profits of such multi-market firms. See e.g., M. ADELmAN,
supra note 18, at 142-45. See also Gifford, Price Discrimination and Labelling,
supra note 143, at 406-07.
338. See text accompanying notes 133-144 supra.
339. See note 337 supra.
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firm's funding of plant or equipment replacement, the firm has
been weakened.340 A lowered net-profit position may also in-
terfere with the financing of expansion. When profits are re-
duced, less margin is available to support interest charges; also,
a firm with low profits may be in a disadvantageous position
from which to attract borrowed capital at low rates or from
which to attract equity capital.34 1 The size of the preexisting
profit margins and the amount of their erosion will determine
the extent of the remaining cushion, which is the crucial ele-
ment in borrowing. Lowered per-unit profits may also interfere
with expansion by shrinking the margin available to support
transportation, delivery, and marketing expenses on the fringes
of the firm's marketing areas.342 In addition, reduced profits,
which decrease a firm's ability to cope with expected cost in-
creases in supply prices of such essentials as raw materials, la-
bor, and overhead expenses, weaken that firm.343
D. EFFECTS ON THE MARKET
Some cases suggest that legally cognizable harm occurs
only when the weakening effects discussed above afflict rivals
sufficient in number or size to produce an impact on competi-
340. Thus, for example, decreased returns that are in excess of properly
chargeable costs, but that are inadequate to meet contractually-set loan repay-
ment obligations at the dates specified, may significantly interfere with a firm's
ability to continue its operations. Any firm with low profits and no accumu-
lated surplus is vulnerable to such financial embarrassment.
341. Although a profit shrinkage may adversely affect the terms on which a
firm can obtain equity or borrowed capital, the higher return that the firm must
pay to acquire funds is not a direct determinant of its market behavior. This is
because the payment of such a return to its investors is not relevant to the de-
termination of a price-output policy that will maximize its short-run profits.
The higher cost of such capital, however, may prevent expansion and may ad-
versely affect the firm's cash-flow position, increasing its vulnerability to the ag-
gressive behavior of its rivals. See Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 923, 928 (10th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of interference
with capital financing as cognizable injury under the Robinson-Patman Act, see
E.B. Muller & Co., 33 F.T.C. 24, 51 (1941), affd, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944). See
also Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 1965).
342. See also Gifford, Assessing Secondary-Line Injury, supra note 8, at 81-
84.
343. When decreased profits prevent a firm in close competition with the
discriminator from expanding at a rate that would preserve its preexisting mar-
ket share, the effects are ambiguous from a Robinson-Patman standpoint. So
long as that reduction in market share is filled by firms other than the discrimi-
nator, the change in market positions may primarily reflect the replacement of
an inefficient firm with efficient ones. The resultant level of concentration in
the market, the vigor and intensity with which the substitute firms compete,
and the pressure that they exert upon price leadership and consciously parallel
pricing behavior are, of course, the prime factors requiring examination.
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tion. In theory, according to these cases, adverse impacts upon
one or several rivals in a market of many sellers would not nec-
essarily constitute harm under the Robinson-Patman Act.344
Such a conclusion would be especially appropriate where the
adverse impact was likely to be felt only by marginally existing
firms whose inefficiencies jeopardized their continued exist-
ence.
Yet in many markets there exist only a few sellers or only
a few large sellers.35 In these circumstances the continued
existence and viability of each seller is a significant factor in
preserving the existing degree of competition.346 A significant
weakening of even one such seller can, therefore, constitute the
harm contemplated by the Act. Even when the adversely af-
fected seller is a marginal one, its weakening or demise may be
significant if it otherwise would have contributed to the mainte-
nance of price competition. The degree, then, to which injury
to a competitor equals injury to competition depends upon (i)
the extent to which the cost-demand structure of the afflicted
firm would otherwise have induced it to engage in competitive
pricing behavior,3 7 and (ii) the impact of its continued pres-
ence in engendering market uncertainty among its more
financially secure rivals with concomitant inducement of price-
competitive behavior by them.m
It should also be noted that the marginality of a firm's
existence is a matter of degree and of viewpoint. When adverse
profit conditions are forced upon a market through the discrim-
inatory pricing behavior of a significant seller, the weaker firms
will be the first to go under. Questions will arise over whether
the demised firms would have gone under anyway and how sig-
344. See Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1967); Anheuser-
Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1961); Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710,
750 (1965), affd in part; rev'd in part, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968); Purex Corp.,
51 F.T.C. 100, 108-17 (1954). See also Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674,
680 (5th Cir. 1965); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMITTEE
TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 163-66 (1955); Areeda & Turner, supra note 3, at
727. Although the Act refers not only to injury to general competitive condi-
tions, but also to injury to "competition with any person who ... grants [a]
discrimination," the reference is nonetheless directed to preventing injury to
"competition" rather than to competitors as such. See Purex Corp., 51 F.T.C. at
112.
345. See also E. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 88, at 68, 100.
346. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710, 750 (1965).
347. The peculiar demand and cost conditions affecting each firm obviously
influence its marketing strategies. See also Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting,
supra note 3, at 1089-90.
348. See also Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 99 S. Ct. 925, 933 (1979);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 457 (1978).
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nificant, therefore, the long-run competitive condition of the
market was to the particular discriminatory price behavior
which accompanied their demise.3 49 Thus, in several cases the
Commission or the courts have attributed the demise of some
firms to factors other than the discriminatory pricing. Some-
times these factors have been ones peculiar to the failed
firms;35 0 at other times they have been conditions prevailing in
the industry.351 To the extent that the demise of these firms
was preordained by factors other than the discriminatory pric-
ing, the latter should not be charged with causing that demise.
Yet when the cause was the combination of firm or industry
conditions and the impact of the discriminatory pricing, the
conclusion is not so clear. If the impact of the discriminatory
pricing merely delivers the coup de grace to a few firms strug-
gling against insolvency, then it seems correct to consider the
pricing a contributing cause of the immediate failure of the
firms but deny that competitive conditions in the marketplace
have diminished in any real sense.
Finally, the National Dairy analysis requires special men-
tion in a review of market effects. When a firm prices both be-
low its own costs and so low that rivals cannot respond, it
exhibits the pattern of behavior that the Commission and the
Seventh Circuit condemned in National Dairy.3 52 This behav-
ior is especially vulnerable to condemnation since it effectively
prevents rival firms from competing in the affected market dur-
ing the period in which the discriminatorily low prices are in
effect and possibly thereafter, depending on the storable char-
acteristics of the commodity and the quantities available to
buyers during the discrimination period. Moreover, to the ex-
tent that the Commission and the courts are willing to project
present market impact into the future-either because the dis-
criminator is considered likely to repeat its conduct, or for an-
other reason-vulnerability of this behavior is increased.353
This National Dairy behavior would likely be condemned also
under the recent cases which classify any sales below marginal
cost as predatory.35 4
In retrospect, it would appear that, although the Commis-
349. See text accompanying notes 218-19, 298 supra.
350. See note 298 supra.
351. See text accompanying notes 218-19 supra and cases cited.
352. See text accompanying notes 267, 299-302 supra.
353. The Commission was willing, however, to allow post-discrimination ex-
perience to affect the results that a pure projection analysis might have sup-
plied in parts of its National Dairy decision. See note 298 supra.
354. See text accompanying notes 322-25 supra.
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sion and the courts have generally moved away from the Moss
diversion approach to competitive injury, sales diversion none-
theless has remained an important factor in the cases. The
Moss focus upon the diversion of specific sales has been re-
placed by a focus upon diversion of market shares. Despite the
qualified assertions by the Commission and the courts that
they are concerned with competition in the marketplace, sub-
stantial and rapid diversion of market shares has occasionally
been treated as tantamount to primary-line injury. Such treat-
ment, of course, is consonant with the approach, employed by
both the Commission and the courts, that projects market
trends into the future. A projection of rapid market-share
changes and rapidly declining price levels will produce a pic-
ture of a market in which the affected rivals of the discrimina-
tor are eliminated or destroyed as viable and independent
competitive forces. Indeed, the rapidity with which market
shares are currently changing would appear to bear a direct
correlation to the prospect of an official finding of competitive
injury under such a projection approach. Gradual changes in
market shares will be more likely to be perceived as part of the
normal give-and-take functioning of the market and hence as
not meriting projection. This is implied by the Commission's
apparent sensitivity to major market share shifts and is sug-
gested by the Commission's chiding of National Dairy as being
unwilling to wait to expand its market share by the "legiti-
mate" means, which would have taken longer.
Projection of present trends, however, can-as the causa-
tion discussion above implicitly suggests 355-constitute a de-
fensive as well as an offensive device. Sometimes the
technique would be available to attribute business failures or
market-structure changes to factors other than discrimination.
Thus, changes in technology sometimes operate to place partic-
ular classes of firms at a disadvantage, and these disadvantages
sometimes are evidenced in trends over time. Projecting these
trends may result in a characterization of firm failures and mar-
ket-structure changes as due to factors other than discrimina-
tion. Similarly, difficulties experienced by particular firms prior
to a rival's price discrimination may be projected to explain the
later difficulties of the firms as unrelated to the effects of the
discrimination. Moreover, the Commission's projection tech-
nique in portions of National Dairy used subsequent events to
modify the conclusions that a pure projection analysis might
355. See text accompanying notes 348-51 supra.
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otherwise have indicated. 356 Such an approach increases the
flexibility of projection as a defensive device.357
Since the focus of this Article has been on the evaluation of
the primary-line effects of non-predatorily motivated price dis-
crimination, the discussion has concentrated on the traditional
constituents of primary-line injury: injury to individual firms
resulting in injury to competition in the marketplace. The re-
cent proposal of Professors Areeda and Turner, to objectify
predatory pricing and to legitimize pricing that, under that ob-
jective definition, is nonpredatory, would substantially revise
the relevant considerations. To the extent that their objective
definition corresponds with predatory discrimination as tradi-
tionally conceived, nonpredatory discrimination-regardless of
its market effects-would no longer fall under the ban of the
Robinson-Patman Act. And regardless of the actual correspon-
dence between objective predation and traditional predation,
the focus of inquiry in the cases that remained on the official
dockets would be transferred from the marketplace effects to
the relation between the discriminator's prices and his costs.
X. CONCLUSION
Robinson-Patman Act cases have, over time, reflected a
gradual transition from the sales diversion test espoused in
Moss to increasingly sophisticated approaches based upon
market effects and concern with market structure. In earlier
years, the Commission's enforcement imperative influenced it
to develop simplified criteria of legality. Gradually, perhaps be-
cause of the hostile reception these criteria sometimes received
from the courts, the felt urgency of the Commission's enforce-
ment task appears to have diminished. Today, increasing skep-
ticism about the social wisdom of the Act's concern with
primary-line effects has persuaded the courts to be receptive
also to simplified criteria, such as those proposed by Professors
Areeda and Turner, which will eliminate from the agenda of the
courts and Commission all but the most blatantly anticompeti-
tive pricing. Indeed, the Areeda and Turner criteria are
designed to cover the same kind of behavior that in the past
was characterized as predatory, but with the difference that
predatory pricing is given an objective definition. Accordingly,
the need of the Commission and the courts to assess the pri-
356. See note 298 supra.
357. Note, however, that the improvement in versatility also extends to a
projection's use as an offensive device. See note 42 supra.
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mary-line effects of "nonpredatory" price discrimination is,
under this approach, eliminated. These newer criteria share
with those of the early years the characteristics of simplicity
and relative ease of application, but they differ from past crite-
ria because they are based upon a technically respectable
framework of economic analysis.

